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ABSTRACT
RESPONSES TO POVERTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS AND LABOR
Andrew Cowley Johnston
Robert T. Jensen
Throughout my work, I seek to understand policy issues that have consequences for poverty.
Data limitations and non-random assignment of policy treatment make meaningful analysis
challenging in what I argue are important areas of policy; to overcome the empirical challenge I
combine clean natural experiments with rich administrative data to make progress in each
literature. In this collection of essays I look at policy factors for three important determinants of
economic wellbeing: labor supply, human capital formation, and labor demand. (1) Regarding
labor demand, my coauthor and I study the impact of unemployment insurance benefit extensions
on the employment of displaced workers. Using a sharp policy change and rich administrative
data I procured, we are able to make considerable progress. (2) Teacher quality is the most
powerful school-input in human capital formation. To understand how teacher pay affects the
quality of teachers, I leverage a federal policy that provides additional compensation to teachers
serving sufficiently poor schools. Using a regression discontinuity design and rich education data,
I am able to provide further light on this pressing policy issue. (3) Finally, I assess the
consequences of a payroll tax that firms pay on the labor demand. Because the tax increases
after recessions, workers may bear the tax when the labor market is already weak. I use a
discontinuity in the tax schedule and administrative UI data to estimate the consequences of the
tax as a deterrent and the effect of the tax once raised.
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CHAPTER 1

Potential Unemployment Insurance Duration and Labor Supply:
The Individual and Market-Level Response to a Benefit Cut
with Alexandre Mas
Introduction
The debate over unemployment insurance duration reflects the tradeoff between
consumption smoothing, on the one hand, and moral hazard on the other. In the recent
recession, unemployment benefits extended to 99 weeks in some states, and during the
recovery several states cut the duration of their regular benefits programs, leading policy
makers to face important questions: How do recipients respond the permitted duration
of UI benefits, and how do these responses affect the labor market as a whole? These
questions are particularly relevant for understanding the performance of the US labor
market in the Great Recession and its aftermathwhere evidence is thin.1 An additional
consideration for evaluating how UI extensions affect the labor market is that the
aggregate effects of these policies may differ from those implied by the micro response if
there are general equilibrium effects or spillovers, as would be the case if UI recipients
crowded out other jobseekers. With a few notable exceptions (Levine (1993), Lalive et
al. (2013) and Valleta (2014)) we know relatively little about the relationship between the
micro and macro responses to UI extensions.2

1

Studies that have found this relationship include Card and Levine (2000), Katz and Meyer (1990), Moffitt
(1985) and Solon (1979) in the United States and Card, Chetty, Weber (2007), Lalive (2008), Schmieder,
Von Wachter, and Bender (2012), and Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2014) in Western Europe.
2
Levine (1993) estimates the relationship between state and year variation in UI replacement rates and
unemployment durations for uninsured workers. Using data from the CPS and NLYS for 1979-1987 he
finds evidence of displacement. Valleta (2014) uses linked CPS data to examine the relationship between
potential benefit duration by state and exit to unemployment for workers who are likely UI ineligible. On
average he finds no relationship, but he finds that ineligible workers in higher unemployment states have
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In this paper we study the micro and macro effects of a large benefit duration cut that
occurred in 2011 in Missouri using newly available administrative data and regression
discontinuity and difference-in-difference designs. Following the 2007 recession, eight
US states reduced regular UI durations, partly in response to diminished reserves in
state UI trust funds as well as the changing political environment. While there is a
precedent for cutting UI benefit levels, to our knowledge this was the first time states cut
maximum UI benefit durations. Since then, eight states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, North Carolina, Missouri, Michigan, and South Carolina) have cut the duration
of UI benefits to below 26 weeks of maximum benefits, the standard level in place for
over half a century.3
We examine the effect of potential UI benefit duration on the duration of UI
receipt, reemployment, wages, and the unemployment rate by examining the cut in UI
benefit weeks implemented in Missouri in April 2011. This reduction, which occurred
while Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) was in effect, resulted in
dislocated workers receiving up to 16 fewer weeks of UI eligibility than they would have
had received if they had applied previously.4 The policy change was sudden and
unanticipated; only five days passed between when the legislation was first proposed

higher exit rates when potential duration is higher. Lalive et al. (2013) find evidence of displacement by
comparing regions in Austria with longer and shorter potential duration for older workers. Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2015) conclude that there is potential crowding out during recessions using variation in
benefit levels across states and over time. There is also a literature testing for externalities from job search
assistance programs in Western Europe. These include Blundell et al. (2004), Crepon et al. (2013), Ferracci
et al. (2010), and Gautier et al. (2012). Davidson and Woodbury 1993 consider displacement effects from
reemployment bonuses in the US. General equilibrium estimates in Hagedorn et al. (2013), Hagedorn et al.
(2015), and Marinescu (2014) are also related to tests for the presence of externalities.
3
In 2010 all states had a maximum duration of benefit eligibility of at least 26 weeks.
4
Specifically, the cuts were 16 weeks for UI recipients previously eligible for 26 weeks of regular state UI
and eligible to participate in the EUC program.

2

and when the law applied to UI claimants.5 The timing was such that there was almost
no opportunity for claimants to shift the timing of their claims.
We use rich unemployment insurance administrative data and wage records from
Missouri and a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the effects of this
policy, where the running variable is calendar time and the threshold of interest is the
exact week the law was enacted.6 The novel administrative data we obtained not only
allow us to see UI receipt but also re-entry in employment and wages which has not
been possible in the vast majority of domestic papers investigating UI, none of which
uses data from the recent decade (see Chetty (2010); Landais (2015); Krueger and
Meyer (2002)). By observing employment we can rule out alternative explanations of UI
exit including migration and labor-force exit, and demonstrate persuasively that early exit
from UI flows into gainful employment.
Our findings indicate economically and statistically significant rates of exit from UI
for claimants subject to the shorter benefit duration relative to claimants with the longer
duration at the cutoff, resulting in an estimated sensitivity of unemployment duration to
potential UI duration that is at the upper end of the literature. As found in Card, Chetty,
and Weber (2007) in the case of Austria, and Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender
(2012) in the case of Germany, we find evidence that some UI recipients are forwardlooking. For example, UI recipients subject to the benefit cuts had 57 weeks of eligibility,
but were 12 percentage points less likely to be receiving UI by week 20 of their spell,
from a base of 46 percent. We estimate that a one-month reduction of UI duration
reduces the duration of UI receipt by 15 days, on average, and that approximately 54

5

The legislation was a compromise aimed at breaking a Republican filibuster in the Missouri State Senate.
More precisely, this is an interrupted time-series design, but we use RDD methods and for convenience
refer to the design as a RDD throughout.
6

3

percent of this change is through changes in exit rates occurring prior to benefit
exhaustion.
Analysis of wage records for the universe of legally employed Missouri workers
indicate that those exiting early from UI enter employment. The estimates imply that a
one-month cut in potential duration resulted in a reduction of nonemployment duration of
approximately 10 days. The findings suggest that the benefit cut increased job search
intensity. However, we find limited effects of shorter benefit durations on the UI exit
hazard rate after 20 weeks of UI, and for the long-term unemployed we find no evidence
that lower potential duration leads to higher employment rates after exhaustion.
As in Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), we find no significant differences in the average
quarterly earnings for the first job of recipients, conditional on employment relative to the
comparison group, suggesting that those induced to exit unemployment earlier are not
penalized with lower wages.
The effects of extended UI on other job seekers is theoretically ambiguous. If
there is job rationing, which can arise in search models with diminishing returns to labor
and wage stickiness (Michaillat 2012), increased search effort leads to negative
externalities on other workers. However, there are no externalities in models with
constant marginal returns to labor and perfectly elastic labor demand (Landais et al.
2010; Hall 2005). In models of Nash bargaining (such as Pissarides 2000) the macro
elasticity of UI benefits is larger than the micro elasticity as a result of the “wage
externality”. To assess spillovers, we calculate the predicted path of the unemployment
rate from the benefit, using the survivor function from the RDD and the flow of initial UI
claims. In the simulation we assume that jobseekers not affected by the UI cut are not
displaced from employment by UI recipients who were exposed to the policy, or other
spillovers. We compare this predicted path to the actual path of the unemployment rate
4

from a difference-in-difference (DiD) estimate of the cut. We find that the simulated and
estimated paths of the macro effect closely match. The predicted and estimated paths
are approximately the same in levels, and follow a similar U-shaped pattern peaking at
approximately a 1 percentage point drop in the state unemployment rate. We find no
evidence that the cut led to changes in the size of the labor force. The analysis suggests
the labor market absorbed the jobseekers without displacement, even though the
unemployment rate was high at the time of the cut at 8.6 percent. The findings are more
consistent with a labor market characterized by a flat labor demand curve in the
framework of Landais et al. (2010).
Our study also speaks to the question of the labor market effects of UI
extensions during the Great Recession. During this period, UI benefits increased from
the near-universal length of 26 weeks to up 99 weeks in some states. Subsequently,
declining unemployment led to reductions in extended benefits, and benefit duration
largely returned to pre-recession levels following the expiration of the EUC program in
2013. The labor market effects from these changes in benefit duration are a central
question for labor market policy and have been the focus of a number of studies.
Notably, recent papers studying this period in the United States have used state level
variation in benefit lengths to estimate the effects of increases (Rothstein 2011; Farber
and Valleta 2015) and declines (Farber, Rothstein, and Valleta 2015) in UI potential
duration in the US over the 2007 recession period and its aftermath. These researchers
found fairly small effects of extended benefit lengths on unemployment. Hagedorn et al.
(2013) and Hagedorn et al. (2015) find small effects of changes in potential duration on
jobseekers, but large macro effects on wages, job vacancies, labor force participation
and employment. Ours is the first study to use a design-based approach with
administrative micro data covering UI receipt, employment, and wages to study the labor
5

market effects of changes in maximum duration in this period. While we find no evidence
of moral hazard for the long-term unemployed, we identify a fairly large response to the
benefit cut for a subset of participants early in the spell.
II. Institutional Background
In the United States, UI is administered by state governments but is overseen
and regulated by the federal government. Before 2011, eligible laid-off workers received
up to 26 weeks of regular unemployment insurance benefits if they were not reemployed
before their benefits are exhausted. During periods of unusually high unemployment,
state and federal governments have extended potential benefit duration, to support the
long-term unemployed after regular benefits are exhausted. Two programs provide these
extended benefits: the Extended Benefit (EB) and the EUC programs.
EB is a permanent program that provides extended benefits in states with high
unemployment to unemployed workers who exhaust their regular state benefits. Until
recently, the federal government split the cost of EB with state governments. Through
the Recovery Act passed in February 2009, Congress temporarily suspended cost
sharing and the federal government bore all the cost of EB through December 2013. EB
extended benefits are triggered as a function of a state’s total and insured
unemployment rate, and triggering thresholds vary by state.7 When the federal

7

In Missouri the 13-week EB extension can be triggered in two ways. First, EB is triggered if the
unemployment rate among insured workers (IUR) is at least 5 percent over the previous 13 weeks and the
IUR is 120 percent of the IUR for the same 13-week period in the previous two years. Second, EB can be
triggered if the IUR for the previous 13 weeks is at least 6 percent, regardless of the IUR in previous years.
If IUR crosses either of these thresholds, the state automatically enrolls unemployed workers in 13
additional weeks of benefits if they exhaust their regular benefits.

6

government took on all of the costs of EB, Missouri temporarily enacted legislation to
implement an additional trigger that would increase EB duration from 13 to 20 weeks.8
EUC has been enacted periodically through federal legislation when unemployment is
high. During the Great Recession, the EUC program was active from June 2008 through
December 2013. In its most recent version, federal benefits provided longer extensions
for states with higher rates of insured unemployment.9
The benefit cut in Missouri was the byproduct of a Republican filibuster, led by
four lawmakers in the Missouri State Senate; they objected to legislation that would
accept federal money to extend UI benefits under the EB program. The bill would have
allowed for the continuation of 20 additional weeks of benefits to unemployed workers
who exhausted their EUC and regular benefits at no cost to Missouri.10 The extension
had already passed the Missouri State House by a margin of 123 to 14. The first news
reports of the filibuster were on March 4, 2011 (Wing 2011). On April 6 a report indicated
that the lawmakers had agreed to end their filibuster, though the article did not specify
terms (Associated Press 2011). On April 8 the St. Louis Post Dispatch published the first
article detailing the possible compromise. Under the compromise, regular benefits would
be cut from 26 to 20 weeks in exchange for Missouri accepting federal dollars and
maintaining EB benefits for the long-term unemployed (Young 2011). In effect, the
agreement traded-off longer UI durations in the short run (for the long-term unemployed)
in exchange for shorter UI durations in the long run. We found no press reports prior to

8

If the total unemployment rate (TUR) was at least 8 percent and 110 percent of the TUR for the same 3month period in either of the two previous years, the duration of EB would increase from 13 to 20 weeks
(http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1466).
9
If a state had less than 6% unemployment, EUC provided 14 additional weeks after regular benefits were
exhausted; 28 weeks if less than 7% (but greater than 6%); 37 weeks if less than 9 (but greater than 7%);
and 47 weeks if greater than 9%.
10
The lawmakers leading the filibuster argued that accepting these funds would increase the federal deficit
unnecessarily.

7

April 8 regarding the possibility of cutting the duration of regular benefits as a possible
compromise for the filibuster. This legislation appears to have been unanticipated. On
April 13 the Missouri House of Representatives passed the bill which Jay Nixon, the
Democrat governor, signed into law on the same day (Selway 2011). All new claims
submitted after that date were subject to the abbreviated benefits (Mannies 2011).
Federal regulations calculate EUC weeks eligible in proportion to regular state UI
benefits. Thus, the cut in regular state UI benefits triggered an additional 10-week
reduction in EUC, and the maximum UI duration fell from 73 weeks for claimants
approved by April 13, to 57 weeks for claimants approved afterwards resulting in a total
change in potential duration of 16 weeks. EB was a non-factor for new claimants at this
time (with or without the benefit cut) because EB phased out by the time they were
eligible.
The change in potential UI duration was the only change in Missouri’s UI system
in the legislation. We corresponded with Missouri UI program administrators who told us
that there were no changes in the administration of the program, including search
requirements or communications with UI recipients. For example, they did not send
additional notices informing UI recipients affected by the policy change.
For convenience, we label recipients applying for UI after the law the “treatment group”
and recipients applying before the policy change the “control group.”

III. Data
Our analysis utilizes administrative data from the state of Missouri covering
workers, firms, and UI recipients from 2003 to 2013. We use three data files for the
analysis. The first is a worker-wage file detailing quarterly earnings for each worker with
8

unique (but de-identified) employee and employer IDs. The second is an unemployment
claims file that contains the same worker and employer IDs as the wage file. For each
claim, we observe the date the claim was filed, the weekly benefit amount, the maximum
benefit amount over the entire claim, the dates weekly benefits were issued, the wage
history used to calculate benefits and duration, and the benefit regime (i.e., regular
benefits, EB, or EUC). For every claim, we link the records for regular benefits, EB, and
EUC claims to construct a single continuous history associated with each claim. The
third dataset reports a limited set of employer characteristics including detailed industry
categories. The raw data contains 1,635,993 initial UI claims over 2003-2013 and
184,191 in 2011. We remove claims ineligible for UI, including unemployed workers who
were fired for cause or quit voluntarily, observations with missing claim types (regular,
EB, or EUC) or missing base-period earnings, and EB or EUC claims that could not be
traced to an initial regular claim. To aid in interpreting the effects, we also limit the
sample to those workers who, based on their earnings histories, would have been
eligible for the full 26 weeks of regular UI benefits without the policy change. Specifically,
the formula for maximum potential duration of regular benefits is:
𝐸

1

Regular Potential Duration = min(𝑋, ( 3 ) (𝐵))
where E is a measure of total base period earnings, B is the average weekly benefit,
and X is 26 weeks on or before April 13, 2011 as well as 20 weeks after this date.
Because we want to focus on workers who are affected by the cut in maximum duration
we select recipients for whom

𝐸
3𝐵

≥ 26. This procedure does not induce any mechanical

change in the characteristics of workers across the policy change threshold. These “full
eligibility” claimants represent 72 percent of all claimants in 2011 and 67 percent of all
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claimants for the entire 2003-2013 period. After these screens we have 1,064,652 claims
over the 2003-2013 period and 127,710 claims in 2011.
Descriptive statistics for the administrative data appear in Table 1. Column (1)
reports summary statistics for the full 2003-2011 period and column (2) for 2011. The
average weekly benefit in 2011 in the sample was $260. UI recipients eligible for the
maximum benefit duration had an average of 14.5 quarters of tenure in their previous
employer and their earnings in the last complete quarter of employment prior to
collecting UI benefits was $8,259. Earnings in the first complete quarter of employment
after the UI spell average $7,240. On average, recipients claiming benefits in 2011
received 29.3 weeks of unemployment benefits.
For the aggregate analysis we use data from the Local Area Unemployment
Statistics (LAUS) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For outcomes we use the
state-by- calendar month unemployment rate, the natural log of number of unemployed,
and the natural log of the size of the labor force. We deseasonalize these variables by
regressing each outcome on state × month dummies over the 2001-2005 period and
then deviating each outcome in 2005-2013 from the predicted value of this regression.
We also use these variables derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to
assess robustness.
IV. Empirical Design
To identify the causal effect of longer UI duration, we utilize the discrete change
in the maximum UI duration resulting from a rapid and unexpected policy change:
claimants who applied just before April 13, 2011 were eligible for 73 weeks of benefits
and those who applied after were eligible for 57 weeks. We use this discontinuity to
compare similar displaced workers entering the same labor market who experienced
very different UI benefit durations.
10

The natural experiment’s contribution is significant, in part, because it implicitly
controls for labor-market conditions that may be affected by the reform. In cross-state
settings, treatment not only affects the search effort of a worker, but potentially the
health of the labor market through simulative effects. More fundamentally, state-panel
analyses may suffer because treatment affects significantly different populations, facing
already dissimilar job-market dynamics, even if the policy treatment does not stimulate
employment. Our data and setting allow us to compare extremely similar claimants,
searching in the same labor market who only face different benefit durations, thus
accounting for possible effects on employment that are channeled through the labor
market rather than through changes in search. We model the outcome variable 𝑌𝑖 as a
continuous function of the running variable, the claim week, and estimate the outcome
discontinuity that occurs at the threshold, the date of the policy change:
(1)

𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽𝑇𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥 ′ ) + 𝑢𝑖 ,

where 𝑥𝑖 is the calendar week of the UI claim for person i, 𝑥 ′ is the week of the policy
change, and 𝑇𝑖 equals one if worker i applied after the policy change and zero if she
applied before.11 Thus, 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥 ′ ) is a continuous function of the running variable which
captures the continuous relationship between the application date and the outcome of
interest. Because we control flexibly for the running variable, the model accommodates
smooth seasonal changes, allowing for unbiased estimation of the discrete policy
change. In practice we first collapse the data to the claim week level and weight the
observations by the number of claims in the week, a process that yields identical point
estimates to the micro data. As shown by Lee and Card (2008), heteroskedasticityconsistent inference with collapsed data is asymptotically equivalent to clustering on the
11

We use the claim week because the data can be sparse when using the claim application calendar date,
and there are days with no claims, such as administrative holidays and weekends.

11

running variable. We estimate the model using local linear regression (Hahn, Todd and
Van der Klaauw, 2001) with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) optimal
bandwidth and a triangular kernel. We consider a range of alternative bandwidths to
assess robustness, as well as estimation of a local quadratic using the Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) (CCT) optimal bandwidth.
V. Results
Diagnostics
We begin by testing for manipulation of the running variable, which would occur if
claimants could strategically time their applications around the policy change. Figure 1
plots the frequency distribution of the number of UI claims by week, over the 2009–2012
period. The solid vertical line denotes the time of the policy change, and the dashed
vertical lines denote the same date in the previous years. It is evident in Figure 1 that
there is a great deal of seasonality in claims, with a large spike in claims around the new
year. The policy change occurred after the large seasonal increase, in April, and by this
time claims were at moderate levels. There is no visual evidence of an abnormal spike in
claims before the policy change, as would be the case if claimants could time their
applications apply for longer-lasting UI benefits. Column 1 of Table 2 formally tests for a
discontinuity in claims (McCrary 2008). Estimating a local quadratic model to fit the
curvature in the distribution, we find no significant discontinuity in the relative frequency
of claims.12
Inspection of the frequency distribution does reveal a moderate jump in claims
two weeks after the change in policy. As will be seen, this applicant cohort looks different
in a number of dimensions than recipients who applied before or after this group, and in
particular they appear to have characteristics correlated with being lower duration
12

Appendix Figure 1 displays the fitted quadratic in the frequency distribution.
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claimants. This outlier might be random noise, or it might reflect a failed attempt to time
claims to obtain UI before the cut. To keep the analysis as transparent as possible, we
keep this group in the main sample. However, we have also estimated all models
excluding this cohort. Estimates presented in the Online Appendix show precise but
somewhat smaller estimates on UI receipt and nonemployment when this cohort is
excluded.
As a second examination of design validity, we test for discontinuities in predetermined covariates of UI applicants around the policy change. Because there are
numerous predetermined variables from which we can select, we construct an index of
predicted log initial UI duration using all covariates available in the data set following the
same procedure as Card et al. (2015). To construct the index, we regress log UI duration
on a fourth-order polynomial of earnings in the quarter preceding job loss, indicators for
four-digit industry, and previous job tenure quintiles. Figure 2 plots the mean values of
the covariate index over 2009–2012 by claim week. The continuity in the index around
the threshold is borne out visually, and the RDD estimate of this predicted value at the
cutoff is small and statistically insignificant (column (2) of Table 2). The lack of evidence
of sorting and differences in pre-determined characteristics around the threshold
reinforces the claim that the policy change was unanticipated and difficult or impossible
to game.13
UI Receipt
Figure 3 exhibits the mean duration of realized UI spells by application week.
There is a clear drop in the number of weeks claimed as a function of the claim week.
Column (1) of Panel A in Table 3 shows that the benefit reduction of 16 weeks is

13

As previously discussed, in Figure 2 we see that the cohort receiving claims two weeks after the duration
cut has substantially lower predicted durations. This pattern will be seen in all subsequent analyses.
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associated with 8.7 fewer weeks of UI benefits claimed (s.e. = 1.4), on average.
Estimating the same model but setting the threshold for the same week one year prior to
the cut shows an insignificant difference in the duration of UI receipt between treatment
and control (Table 3/Panel B/column 1). Appendix Figure 4 shows the point-estimate
estimated over a range of alternative bandwidths. The estimate is stable for a wide
range of bandwidthis, including bandwidths smaller than the IK bandwidth and up to
twice as large as the IK bandwidth. Appendix Table 1 reports the estimate excluding the
negative outlier cohort two weeks after the policy change. The estimate is somewhat
smaller but remains highly significant. Appendix Table 2 reports the estimate using a
local quadratic model with the CCT optimal bandwidth. The estimated effect is
somewhat larger than the local linear case, and statistically significant.
To examine the timing of UI receipt, we estimate the probability that an individual
remains on UI through each of the first 73 weeks of the spell. Figure 4 presents binned
scatterplots of the probability that claimants remained on UI in weeks 20, 40, 55, and 60
weeks of UI benefits as a function of their initial claim week. The figure shows that there
is a response to the cut in maximum duration fairly early in the spell. In weeks 20, 40,
and 55, before the treatment group exhausted benefits, it can be seen visually that the
duration cut is associated with a lower probability of receipt. By week 60, the probability
of remaining in UI for the treated group falls to close to zero, consistent with all
remaining claimants in the treatment group exhausting their benefits, while 26 percent of
the comparison group was still receiving UI at that point. In none of these series do we
see a similar break one year prior to the policy change (denoted by the dashed vertical
line).
Table 3 columns (2)–(5) report the point estimates for the probability that the UI
spell lasted until weeks 20, 40, 55, and 60. The RDD estimate for UI receipt is -12.3
14

percentage points in week 20, -11.8 percentage points in week 40, -10.1 percentage
points in week 55, and -23.6 percentage points in week 60. All estimates are highly
significant. These shifts are not seen in the corresponding placebo estimates in Panel B.
Placebo estimates are indistinguishable from 0 in all cases except for the probability of
receiving benefits in week 20, which is positive.14 As with unemployment duration, the
estimates are somewhat smaller excluding the outlier two weeks after the policy change
(Appendix Table 1), and somewhat larger when estimating a local quadratic with a CCT
bandwidth (Appendix Table 2) but significant in both cases.
To estimate the timing of the effects over the whole period, we fit variants of
equation (1) where, in each specification, 𝑌𝑖 is the probability that the claimant received
at least T weeks of benefits, where T spans 1 to 73. These estimates give the relative
survival probabilities between the two groups by week. Figure 5 plots each of these RDD
estimates with the associated confidence intervals. Figure 5 shows that the survival
function diverges between the two groups starting early on in the UI spells, until around
week 20 of the UI spell, and then levels out. This pattern implies that the hazard rate for
UI exit is larger for the treatment group than for the control group in the first five months
of the UI spell and then stabilizes.
Note that there is a sharp drop in the survivor rate for the treatment group in
week 20 and a similar drop for the comparison group in week 26. These drops
represent individuals who did not to receive benefits beyond the regular state benefits,
either because they were ineligible since the federal government automatically enrolls
the eligible. Because of these drops in the survivor rate at regular benefit exhaustion
date, we do not interpret the 20–26 week span because any differences over this term
14

Because Easter was on April 24, 2011, we also estimated a placebo specification setting the policy
change just prior to Easter 2010. We found no significant effects for this placebo as well suggesting that
our estimates are not being driven by this holiday.
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reflect a combination of eligibility and behavioral effects. Nevertheless, this pattern
demonstrates the RDD estimates detect expected changes in UI receipt behavior,
confirming our intuition.
Excluding this 20–26 week period, the treatment-control differences in the survivor rate
is stable from week 20 of the UI spell through week 57, at which point there is a
significant drop in the relative survivor rates as the treatment group exhausts EUC
benefits while the control group continues to receive EUC benefits until week 73. The
error bands in Figure 5 show that the first significant difference between the two groups
occurs in week 14, and the differences remain significant for all subsequent weeks.
These estimates indicate claimants respond in a forward-looking way to UI exhaustion,
and most of the response to the duration cut occurs fairly early in the spell, within the
first three months. This time pattern of exit is robust to alternative bandwidths. Appendix
Figure 3 shows the same plots with double the IK bandwidth and the pattern persists.
One way to assess the consistency of the duration and survival RDD estimates is to note
that mean UI duration is the integral of the survival function. Using the discrete analog to
this relationship, summing the estimated survival probabilities through 73 weeks yields
an expected duration of 31.1 weeks in the control group and 21.5 weeks in the treatment
group. The 9.7 week difference in the expected duration implied by the survival
probabilities is close to the 8.7 week RDD estimate. The consistency of the estimates
further reinforces the validity of the design.
The reduction in weeks of UI receipt is a possible combination of “mechanical”
effect of earlier exhaustion for the treatment group and pre-exhaustion UI exit. We can
use the estimated survival probabilities to decompose the overall change in weeks of UI
receipt into two parts: the part due to changes in behavior prior to exhaustion and the
part due to pre-exhaustion exit. The estimated survival function implies that the expected
16

duration conditional on duration being less than 58 weeks is 27.6 weeks in the control
and 21.2 weeks in the treatment. Because E[Duration]= E[Duration|Duration < 58] *
Pr(Duration<58) + E[Duration|Duration ≥58] * Pr(Duration≥58), and Pr(Duration<58) ≈
0.74 in the control group, approximately 54 percent of the change in the overall duration
of UI receipt comes from changes in the response to the cut before exhaustion.
Employment
Using the quarterly wage files we can measure the employment rate for the
treatment and control groups following the policy change. Figure 6 plots the employment
rate by UI application week for four quarters after the benefit cut. Consistent with the
pattern seen for UI exits, in 2011 Q3—the first full quarter after the cut—there is a
noticeable jump in the employment rate for applicants claiming after the duration cut.
The elevated employment rate for the treated group can also be seen in 2011 Q4, 2012
Q1 and 2012 Q2.
Figure 7 presents the RDD estimates and associated 95 percent confidence
intervals for employment rates by quarter, starting in the quarter the policy went into
effect in the second quarter of 2011 through the second quarter of 2013. The RDD
estimate for employment is insignificant in 2011 Q2, the quarter of the policy change. In
2011 Q3—the first complete quarter after the duration cut—the treated group has a 11.9
percentage point higher employment rate than the comparison group. The difference in
employment rates is similar to the 10-12 percentage point difference in the probability of
receipt in the early part of the UI spells over the relevant range, suggesting that those
individuals who leave UI before exhaustion tend to enter employment. The employment
effect fades out by 2012 Q4 at which point both treatment and control have exhausted
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their benefits. The point estimates and standard errors for the employment RDD are
presented in Table 4.15
Conveniently, the 16-week period when the treated group had exhausted
benefits and the control group was still eligible for benefits covers the entire third quarter
of 2012 (as well as part of the second quarter of 2012). Therefore, to assess the effects
of benefit exhaustion for the long-term unemployed in the treatment group, relative to the
control who still received benefits, we can look at the change in the relative employment
rate between the two groups in 2012 Q3 relative to earlier quarters. If exhausting
benefits results in people scrambling and successfully finding employment, we would
expect to see an increase in the RDD estimate for employment relative to the estimate in
the previous quarter and the subsequent quarter. This is not what we find, rather, the
relative employment rates in the treatment and control groups fell over the period. This
suggests that, for the long-term unemployed who did not respond to the policy early,
exhausting UI benefits did not hasten reemployment relative to the control. Instead, the
positive employment effects we observe come from the group of UI recipients who
responded to the changing weeks of eligibility well before exhaustion.16 A caveat to this
conclusion is that at the time the treatment group exhausts the composition of the two
groups differs since there were more exits from UI in the treated group among the
“forward-looking” subset of participants. It is possible that an increase in the exit rate
from this group in the control masks any positive effect of exhaustion on employment in
the treatment group.
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Appendix Table 3 reports local linear estimates excluding the outlier cohort two weeks after the policy
change. Appendix Table 4 reports local quadratic estimates with the CCT optimal bandwidth. We continue
to see significant employment effects in both cases.
16
Appendix Figure 4 shows the same charts using twice the IK bandwidth.
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Figure 8 shows the “placebo” estimate for the employment effect of the benefit
cut. Specifically, we estimate the same model with quarterly employment outcomes for
quarters starting one year prior to the duration cut, setting the placebo duration cut to
April 2010. There are no significant employment estimates over this period.
We can use the estimates corresponding to the relative nonemployment probabilities by
quarter (shown in Figure 7) to calculate the expected difference in the duration of mean
nonemployment between the two groups. If we assume that the relative employment
probabilities between the two groups are the same after the third quarter of 2012, after
which all recipients have exhausted their benefits, summing the estimates in Figure 7
from the quarter of the policy change through 2012 Q3 implies that a one-month
reduction in unemployment duration reduces the number of days of nonemployment by
an average of 10.4 days, with a 95 percent confidence interval of (6.7,14.1).17
Reemployment Earnings
A class of job search models predict that longer provision of unemployment
benefits allow workers to increase their reservation wage and find a more desirable job
match. Longer UI duration could also depreciate human capital resulting in lower wages.
The literature has mixed findings on the relationship between UI benefit duration and
reemployment wages. Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007) found no significant effect of
delay while Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender (2013) find that workers with longer
potential UI spells have lower wages. We find that post-employment earnings do not
change significantly following the cut in duration. Figure 9 shows mean log
reemployment earnings for the first complete quarter after the individual has been
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The confidence interval, which is constructed from the standard errors for each quarterly estimate,
assumes no covariance term between the RDD estimates of employment by quarter.
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reemployed, by application week.18 There is no evidence of a break at the threshold, a
finding that is confirmed by the positive and insignificant estimate on the log
reemployment wage outcome in column (5) of Table 4.
VI. Reconciling the Individual and Market-Level Effect of the Policy
We have documented fairly large responses of the duration of UI receipt and
nonemployment to changes in potential duration. In this section we ask how the cut
affected the aggregate unemployment rate and, further, what the relative magnitude of
the change in the unemployment rate and the change implied by the RDD estimates
implies about possible spillovers, particularly displacement effects from the treated group
crowding out other jobseekers. To this end, we estimate DiD models comparing the
unemployment rate in Missouri to a comparison group of states. We then compare the
estimated change in the Missouri unemployment rate over the period to the change in
the unemployment rate predicted by the estimated change in the survivor function from
the RDD models, assuming no market-level spillovers. A comparison of the two series is
informative about the degree of spillovers.
In Figure 10 we plot the raw difference between the deseasonalized
unemployment rates in Missouri and the average of all other states by month. The figure
shows what appears to be a decline in the unemployment rate in Missouri coinciding
with the duration cut as we see a relative reduction in the Missouri unemployment rate,
peaking at just over 1 percentage point, following the April 2011 cut.
In Figure 11 we compare Missouri to a synthetic control using the method of
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) which
assigns weights to states as to minimize the mean squared prediction error between the
treatment and control states in the pre-intervention period for a set of outcomes. To
18

Our data contains information on quarterly earnings.

20

construct weights for the comparison group, we use as predictors the unemployment
rate for each month from January 2009 – March 2011 and 1-digit NAICS industries.19
The figure plots the Missouri unemployment rate against the weighted unemployment
rate for the synthetic control. The figure shows a similar drop as when we use the
unweighted comparison group of states, with the relative unemployment rate declining,
peaking at almost a one-percentage point decline, and then gradually reverting back to
the control.
Next we compare these relative changes in the state unemployment rate to the
changes in the unemployment rate predicted by the RDD estimates assuming no
spillovers. For every week 𝜏 relative to the week of the benefit cut (𝜏=0), we compute the
predicted change in the number of unemployed (∆𝑛̂𝜏 ) due to the policy as:
73
𝐶
𝑇
∆𝑛̂𝜏 = ∑57
𝑡=0(𝑝̂𝑡 − 𝑝̂𝑡 ) ∗ 𝑐𝜏−𝑡 + ∑𝑡=58(−0.05) ∗ 𝑐𝜏−𝑡 ,

where 𝑐𝜏−𝑡 is the number of initial UI claims in week 𝜏 − 𝑡 if 𝜏 − 𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑐𝜏−𝑡 = 0 if 𝜏 − 𝑡 <
0, and 𝑝̂𝑡𝑇 and 𝑝̂𝑡𝐶 are the estimated probabilities that UI recipients are receiving benefits t
weeks into the spell for the treatment and control groups respectively. An underlying
assumption, which the analysis above supports, is that pre-exhaustion exits out of UI
represent moves out of unemployment and into employment. For UI recipients who first
received benefits 58–73 weeks prior to the week of April 13, we make the assumption
that the relative difference in the relative exit rate out of unemployment between
treatment and control is the RDD estimate for the employment probability outcome in
2012 Q3. We assume that after 73 weeks, beyond the duration of the program in the
control period, there are no differences in relative unemployment exit rates, an
assumption that is consistent with the insignificant employment probabilities between the
19

The procedure assigns weights of 4.3% to Arizona, 37.2% to Georgia, 7.7% to Idaho, 2.1% to Indiana,
7.6% to Massachusetts, 23.2% to Minnesota, 12.1% to Oklahoma, 5.9% to Pennsylvania, and 0 to all other
states.
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two groups after they both exhaust. We then compute the predicted change in the
unemployment rate in each week after April 13, 2011 as ∆𝑛̂𝜏 /𝑙𝜏 , where 𝑙𝜏 is labor force
participation.
Figure 12 plots the predicted change in the state unemployment rate by week
against the DiD estimates (by month) of the change in the Missouri unemployment rate
expressed relative to the value in March 2011, the month before the cut. The DiD
estimates not only line up closely to the predicted change, but the series exhibit the
same U-shaped pattern with the unemployment decline, peaking at close to 1
percentage point and kinking up at the same time as the predicted change. It appears
that the assumption of no spillovers used to form the predicted response is appropriate
as the increased exit rate of the UI applicants translated into a lower unemployment rate.
Table 5 reports the estimates for the DiD models fit over the 2009–2013 period
and with the intervention period defined as April 2011 through December 2013. The unit
of observation is at the month-bystate level, and we estimate all models with state fixed
effects, calendar month dummies, and with and without a Missouri-specific trend.20
Computing standard errors is complicated in cases where there is only one intervention
unit. The primary concern when using grouped data in a DiD analysis is how to account
for possible serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Though we use
data from all 50 states and the District of Columbia, we cannot cluster on state because
the relevant degrees of freedom is the number of intervention units (Imbens and Kolesar
2012), which in this case is a single state. As an alternative, we employ a number of
different approaches for inference. For the unweighted DiD estimates we report OLS
standard errors, panel-corrected standard errors, confidence intervals from a wild
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We have also estimated models with state-specific trends, which yield almost the same point estimates.
However, these models are not well suited for bootstrapping so we opted for the more parsimonious model.
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bootstrap using the empirical t-distribution (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008), and the
percentile rank of the coefficient from a permutation exercise where we estimate a
placebo effect of the cut for every state for the post-April 2011 period. For the synthetic
control estimates, we report the percentile rank from the permutation exercise.
Specifically, for every state we form its state-specific synthetic control and compute the
mean difference in the outcome between the state and the state-specific control as if the
state were treated. Table 5 also includes the average post-intervention predicted change
in the unemployment rate from the RDD estimates, which can be compared to the DiD
estimates as assess the degree of spillovers.
The DiD estimate using the unweighted control is -0.94 percentage points
(column 1), and -0.82 percentage points with a Missouri-specific trend. These estimates
are interpretable as the difference in the Missouri unemployment rate in the period April
2011-December 2013 relative to January 2009-March 2011 and relative to the average
change in all other states. The estimates are statistically significant from 0 as well as
from the predicted change in the unemployment rate, in both models using OLS
standard errors, panel corrected standard errors, and the wild bootstrap confidence
intervals. The percentile ranks are 9.8% (column 1) and 0.0% (column 2) meaning that in
specification 1, 9.8 percent of states have more negative estimated effects while in
specification 2 no states have more negative estimated effects. Column (3) presents the
synthetic control estimates. The DiD point-estimate is -0.78, which has an associated
percentile rank of 3.9 percent. The estimate is also close but somewhat larger than the
predicted change.
Next we separately look at the numerator and denominator of the unemployment
rate. In Table 5 columns (4)–(6) we estimate the same models using the log of the
number of unemployed as the dependent variable. Across specifications, we see large
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and significant declines in the number of unemployed, in the range of 10–12 percent
depending on the specification. These estimates are close to the predicted change in the
number of unemployment from the RDD estimates of 8.7 percent. Columns (7)–(9)
report the estimates for log size of the labor force. The estimates range from a −0.5
percent decline in the unweighted control with a Missouri-specific trend (column 7) to a
−0.9 percent decline in the synthetic control (column 9). While the upper wild bootstrap
confidence interval is below 0 in column (7), the permutation percentile ranks of the
estimates are large at 25.5 percent and 19.6 percent suggesting that there is little
evidence of a statistically significant change in the size of the labor force. The change in
the unemployment rate appears to be driven instead by a change in the number of
unemployed rather than a change in the size of the labor force.
In Appendix Table 2 we reproduce this analysis using these measures derived
from the Current Population Survey. The magnitudes are close to those from LAUS, and
while noisier they are still reasonably precise. This analysis shows that our findings are
not driven by how the LAUS data are constructed.
We have also computed p-values for the difference-in-differences estimate of the
effect of the policy change on the unemployment rate based on the approach of
Ibragimov and Müller (2014). To implement this test we limit the sample to 28 months on
each side of the policy change, and collapse the monthly difference between the
Missouri and the average of the comparison group unemployment rates (denoted for
convenience UMO-CO,t) into blocks of months of varying sizes (28, 14, 7, 4, 3, and 2 blocks
in each of the pre and post periods). We then conduct a two-sample t-test of equality of
UMO-CO in the pre and post periods using the collapsed data and N-2 degrees of freedom.
In these tests the sampling variances are estimated from variation in UMO-CO across
blocks of months, and in doing so we assume independence of UMO-CO across blocks of
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months, but allow for arbitrary correlation within blocks. Under the conventional
assumption of weak dependence in time series data, observations that are far apart will
be less correlated to each other than those close together, and we would therefore
expect less auto-correlation when grouping more months together into larger blocks than
smaller blocks. By comparing p-values across block groups we can assess the degree to
which the inference is serially robust. Looking across the columns of Table 6, this indeed
appears to be the case. For the unweighted and synthetic controls we can reject equality
of the pre and post period values of UMO-CO for all block groupings, even when we
collapse the sample to just two blocks on either side of the cut-off, where autocorrelation should be minimal. Appendix Table 3 shows the same test for the CPS
derived sample.
Our conclusion from this analysis is that there is reasonably strong evidence that
the increase in exit rates translated into a lower unemployment rate. Moreover, while an
important caveat is that in a single unit intervention it is not straightforward to compute
correct standard errors, the point-estimates suggest that there were limited displacement
effects due to the higher employment rates from the treated group. This analysis also
supports another assumption: that the behavioral response is not local to the time of the
policy change. If the effect were transitory, we would not expect to see a pronounced
and growing change in the state unemployment rate.

VII. Discussion
The UI receipt estimates imply that a one-month reduction in potential UI duration leads
to a 15-day reduction in UI spells (marginal effect = 0.5) and 10 fewer days of
nonemployment (marginal effect = 0.3). These estimates are larger than what has been
typically found in the literature using data from earlier decades in the US and in Western
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Europe. Katz and Meyer (1990) estimate marginal effects of changes in potential UI
duration on UI spells in the range of 0.13–0.2, and Card and Levine (2000) who find a
marginal effect on UI spells of 0.065. The estimates on nonemployment duration are
larger than those in Card, Chetty, and Weber (2007), Schmieder, Von Wachter, and
Bender (2012), and Lalive (2008) who find marginal effects on nonemployment in the
range of 0.09-0.13. Our estimates are closer to Le Barbanchon (2012) (marginal effect =
0.3) and Centeno and Novo (2009) (marginal effect = 0.22). As pointed out in
Schmieder, Von Wacther and Bender (2012), who draw from Baily (1978) and Chetty
(2008), a summary measure of the disincentive effects of changes in UI duration is the
ratio of the effects of changes in potential UI duration on nonemployment and UI receipt.
In our setting this ratio (≈ 0.67) is approximately twice as large as the ratio in Schmieder,
Von Wacther and Bender (2012) (≈ 0.3-0.4).
We find that the increased hazard rate out of unemployment insurance occurs in the first
twenty weeks of the UI spell and then stabilizes. While there is previous evidence of this
kind of anticipatory effects (Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender 2012; Card, Chetty,
and Weber 2007), it is perhaps surprising that the hazard rate of exit spikes early and
then stabilizes. It is possible that the media attention following the policy made the
duration cut more salient in the minds of some UI recipients, resulting in increased
search intensity. However, this explanation would imply that the change in behavior is
mainly local to the time of the cut, and less pronounced for subsequent cohorts of UI
recipients. As discussed, since the path of the unemployment rate tracks the predicted
path, which is based on the assumption that the change in the survivor function is
permanent, this explanation is less compelling.
Another explanation is that recipients were confused by the policy change, believing that
the cut would give them only 20 weeks of benefits and not the federal benefits which
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were an additional 37 weeks. It is possible that recipients interpreted the law in this way,
but our review of media reports and Missouri communications to UI recipients provide no
evidence that the information disseminated would lead to this kind of confusion. The
media coverage at the time emphasized that the reduction was a compromise
to preserve extended benefits (e.g Young 2011). The initial packet sent to claimants
before and after the law change was identical and did not explicitly state the number of
weeks of eligibility for regular UI. Rather, the notice states the maximum benefit and the
weekly benefit. The number of weeks of eligibility would be derived from the ratio of
these two numbers (see Appendix Figure 5 for an example of this document). No other
wording was changed and no information about extended benefits was provided in the
initial packet for either the treatment or control group. Instead, the claimant were
informed when they logged into Missouri UI website (MODES) whether extended
benefits were in effect and they also received a call informing them that extended
benefits are available. When the claimant exhausted their benefits they were reminded
in correspondence that EUC was available and eligible claimants were automatically
enrolled. These procedures did not change with the law. Because the policy change was
so clearly described even in the headlines and the information regarding regular and
extended benefits were continuous at the time of the policy change, we find it difficult to
sustain an argument that policy understanding was affected discontinuously at the
threshold. Nevertheless, if there was confusion, it is interesting that some exiting
recipients responded well before the 20 week mark and were largely able to find
employment.
The findings suggest that there is a forward-looking group of recipients who respond
early to changes in potential duration. However, the long-term unemployed who
exhausted benefits did not have higher rates of reemployment relative to the group that
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remained on UI. This can be seen most clearly in the comparison of employment rates
during the period that the treated group had no benefits remaining while the comparison
group remained eligible. There is no evidence that the employment rate rose for the
group exhausting benefits during this period (with the caveat that the control group at
this point has a different composition near exhaustion as it contain a subset of the
“forward-looking” types). This finding suggests that the benefit cut increased
reemployment rates for a subset of individuals who responded early in the spell, but for
the remaining recipients UI continued to serve an insurance function with limited moral
hazard response.
The estimated macro effect of the cut is also larger than what other papers have found.
Marinescu (2014) estimates that a 10 percent increase in benefits corresponds to a 0.7
percent decline in the unemployment rate and Hagedorn et al.’s (2015) estimates imply
that a 10 percent decrease in maximum benefit durations led to a 1.7 percent decrease
in the unemployment rate as a result of the decrease in the number of unemployed. In
our case, a 10 percent decrease in benefits was associated with approximately a 5
percent decrease in the unemployment rate. Unlike Hagedorn et al. (2015), however, we
find no evidence that the benefit cut increased the labor force participation rate.
Finally, we provide direct evidence on the relative magnitudes of the micro and
macro elasticities with respect to potential UI duration. Unlike Lalive et al. (2013), we find
that the macro elasticity is at least as large as the micro elasticity. Within the framework
of Landais et al. (2010), this finding is consistent with a horizontal aggregate labor
demand curve and suggests that the assumptions of the Baily-Chetty model of optimal
UI, which assume no spillovers, are appropriate in this setting. We note that while the
seasonally-adjusted Missouri unemployment rate was high at the time of the benefit cut,
at 8.6 percent, the labor market nationally was mending, and the finding that the market
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largely absorbed the larger number of workers exiting UI without displacement may not
hold when the unemployment rate is even higher or on an upward trajectory.
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CHAPTER 2

Teacher Compensation, Quality, Retention, and Student Achievement:
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity
Introduction
The United States spends over $304 billion per year in public-school teacher
compensation each year ($6,100 per public school student).21 Despite this extensive
public spending, we know very little about how increased compensation would influence
key education outcomes including student achievement. Because effective teaching
improves a student's future income and citizenship, improving teacher quality promises a
productive response to poverty (Heckman, 2000; Chetty et al., 2011). Unfortunately,
teacher quality is measurably worse at low-income schools (Mansfield, 2013). Perhaps
compensation can be increased at disadvantaged schools to attract and retain capable
teachers, improving equal opportunity. This paper exploits a policy that attempts to do
just that.
Efforts to estimate the relationship between compensation and outcomes
including teacher quality, teacher retention, and student achievement have yielded
mixed results. Several authors have emphasized the difficulty in identifying the causal
relationship between teacher salaries and these variables (Aaronson, Barrow, and
Sander 2003; Hanushek 1997; Murnane 1975; Murnane and Phillips 1981, Hanushek et
al., 2005). Historically, two challenges exist. First, most variation in teacher
compensation is confounded with local priorities, resources, compensating differentials,
and student ability and motivation. Second, there is much disagreement on how to
measure teacher quality (Hanushek et al., 2005).
21

This does not account for unfunded pension liabilities or the 11 percent of students in private
schools
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In this paper, I implement a regression discontinuity design to isolate exogenous
variation in teacher compensation to evaluate how early-career compensation influences
teacher quality, retention, and student performance. Since 1997, the federal government
has offered teachers in low-income schools loan forgiveness for most of their federal
education loans.22 A teacher is automatically eligible if at least 30 percent of students at
her school are considered ``low-income''. Specifically, at least 30 percent of the students
enrolled must meet a measure of poverty under 1113(a)(f) of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA); in practice this is the proportion of students that
qualify for reduced-price lunches since these data are easily available to school
personnel.
Over the years, teacher salary schedules have become increasingly back-loaded
as real starting salaries have fallen and real salaries for experienced teachers have
risen. A question of current interest is whether, in principle, compensation should be
more ``front-loaded'' (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997). Answering this question is difficult
due to multicollinearity between portions of the salary schedule, the gradual onset of
back-loading, and omitted variables describing selection into this practice. The loan
forgiveness program is a valuable natural experiment because it only raises
compensation in the first five years of teaching and does not affect benefits, salary, or
pensions.
I exploit this loan forgiveness policy to estimate the effect of a substantial
increase in teacher compensation on teacher quality, which provides two distinct
contributions to the literature. First, this study is the first to use a quasi-experiment to
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There exists loan forgiveness for all Perkins, Stafford, Direct, and Federal Family Education
loans if the teacher remains five years; only PLUS loans are excluded which are federal loans
parents can take out for their children's education expenses and make up a minority of federal
loan volume
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overcome unobservables and endogenous choice in measuring the effect of teacher
compensation. Second, I isolate the impact of raising starting salaries, which my
theoretical model suggests is the strongest compensation determinant of teacher quality
and retention.
Moreover, this intervention does not come from local school funding so treatment
does not impact schools by affecting other expenditures through the school's budget
constraint. Finally, I link student test scores to teachers to estimate an objective measure
of teacher quality rarely available to previous researchers studying the effects of teacher
compensation. I apply my estimators to a rich North Carolina data set that merges
student, teacher, and school data from 1995 to 2010 including annual measures of
student test scores, teacher assignment, teacher characteristics, and school
characteristics.
Treatment does not appear to affect traditional measures of teacher quality;
schools are no more likely to hire applicants with a master's degree, a math or science
major, or come from more selective undergraduate institutions. However, they are
significantly more likely to hire an education major, which positively predicts student
gains in my data. Treatment also appears to have significant positive effects on teacher
retention, increasing the probability a teacher remains at the school for five years by
about 20 percent. Loan forgiveness does not appear to increase teacher effort, as
proxied by a teacher's non-sick absences. Higher compensation through loan
forgiveness appears, however, to improve student achievement significantly
(conservative estimates are 0.1 standard deviations in math and 0.07 standard
deviations in reading).
The fundamental causal link brought forth by my theoretical model is that
compensation can affect hiring quality through two channels: One, compensation can
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improve the quality of applicants and thus improve the quality of new hires even if the
hiring process is non-discriminating; two, compensation can improve the quality of hires
by expanding the applicant pool, but only if schools can discriminate quality. It is likely
that the loan forgiveness only works through the second channel (expanding applicant
pools); thus the results suggest that schools successfully discriminate on characteristics
that are not observed by researchers. This finding suggests that raising compensation
can raise the quality of new hires, even if the compensation doesn't improve applicant
quality.
Because this treatment can be interpreted as an exogenous supply shifter, I can
estimate the demand for various applicant characteristics. These parameters represent
how schools value various applicant characteristics when hiring. The results indicate
schools prefer applicants who majored in education and dislike applicants who majored
in social science. Somewhat surprisingly schools have no preference for applicants with
master's degrees, applicants from more selective colleges, or applicants with rigorous
degrees in math and science. Schools appear to have no pronounced preference for
teacher race or sex.
Ballou (1996) suggests that schools do not prioritize the applicant qualities that
best predict teaching success. My results suggest that, in North Carolina, teacher
selection is consistent with a model of achievement maximization subject to a budget
constraint. That is, schools appear to prioritize applicant characteristics in approximate
proportion to the characteristic's predicted student-achievement effect.
There is no evidence that schools strategically sort into the program or that
treatment schools differ systematically. Moreover, results are robust to a variety of
alternative specifications and controls. Taken as a whole, results suggest that loan
forgiveness enlarges the applicant pool at treatment schools and schools appear to
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select applicants ``correctly'' by hiring teachers with characteristics that predict effective
teaching.
Although some of the literature reports a positive correlation between teacher
compensation and student or teacher outcomes (student retention and hiring from
selective schools), my results suggest that unobserved factors may be biasing these
previous estimates. For instance, Figlio (1997) reports a significant correlation between
geographically varied starting salary and whether a hire had a hard science major. By
contrast, I find no correlation when using quasi-experimental variation. Instead, teacher
salaries may be correlated with unobserved factors including school amenities, student
characteristics, and principal networks.
This paper fits into a small set of papers that estimate the impact of teacher
compensation on student outcomes or teacher characteristics. Loeb and Page (2000)
use changes in local average wages as an instrument on the local relative wages of
teachers; this design implies that a 10 percent increase in relative wages reduced the
student dropout rate by three to four percent. These results are hard to interpret since
the instrument fails the exclusion restriction: local wages directly affect the opportunity
cost of a high school student remaining in school. Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2005)
used changes in first-year teacher salaries and found no correlation with teacher
effectiveness (as measured by value-add) or certification scores. Clotfelter, Glennie,
Ladd, and Vigdor (2008) used a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach to
determine the effect of a retention bonus on turnover; the bonus was announced after
hiring decisions were finalized so the bonus could not affect teacher quality, but the
incentive reduced the turnover rate by 17 percent. In general, this literature has been
haunted by endogeneity and omitted variables bias, and has been able to only estimate
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effects on a few outcomes at a time, accounting for meager progress on this critical
issue.
Background
Not only are teachers the most significant public input in the education production
function, but also high value-add teachers improve the life outcomes of their students
(Mansfield, 2013; Chetty et al., 2011a, 2011b). Thus the distribution and allocation of
teacher quality affects income mobility and economic growth in the coming decades.
Unfortunately, since 1960, teacher quality measures that correspond to teacher valueadd have been steadily falling in the United States (Murnane et al., 1991, Bacolod,
2007). For instance, while 20 percent of top graduates entered teaching in 1964, fewer
than four percent did in 1992 (Corcoran et al., 2002). At the same time, teacher
experience, the most predictive characteristic of teacher value-add, has quickly fallen
due to rising turnover and reduced class-size (Ingersoll, 2003).
Numerous explanations exist for these falling quality and retention patterns,
including greater opportunities for women and wage compression demanded by
teacher's unions (Hoxby and Leigh, 2004; Bacolod, 2007). I argue that the evolution of
teacher salary schedules has also reduced teacher quality and retention. Policymakers
have allowed the real value of starting teacher salaries to fall even as real salaries for
experienced teachers rose (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997). Thus a starting teacher
earned less in 1994 than she did in 1970, while a teacher with 20 years of experience
earned 20 percent more. In the North Carolina data, this pattern of shrinking starting pay
and growing pay for veteran teachers was sustained throughout the 1990s and into the
2000s.
Of course, all compensation is likely to affect teacher labor supply, but starting
wages may be especially important in attracting and retaining quality teachers. Both
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theory and survey data suggest the relative importance of early compensation levels. In
Appendix A, I present a sequence of simple models demonstrating that starting pay is
especially influential when individuals choosing a career are shortsighted, have limited
information about salary progression in various careers, or are uncertain about whether
they will enjoy their initial career choice. From survey data23 we learn that 79 percent of
teachers leaving the profession (most of whom are new teachers) cite low salary as their
primary reason for departing; this is by far the most common rational teachers give for
departing and it accounts for a larger proportion of responses than the next three largest
reasons combined (Ingersoll, 2003). My analysis is the first to test the impact of
increased starting pay on teacher quality, effort, and retention.
A federal program introduced in 1997, the Teacher Cancellation Low Income
Program, offered student-loan forgiveness to new teachers serving in low-income
schools across the country. Loan forgiveness covered most federal education loans
(subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford and Perkins loans).24 To promote eligible lowincome schools states submit a list of the schools where at least 30 percent of students
qualify as low-income to the federal government each year. These lists are made
available on the internet, so that prospective teachers can easily identify qualifying
schools.
Perkins and Stafford loans undergo different forgiveness schedules. Perkins
forgiveness is pro-rated: 15 percent of the principal is forgiven after the first year of
teaching at a qualified school; an additional 15 percent is forgiven after the second year,
20 percent after the third, another 20 percent after the fourth, and 30 percent after the
fifth year, totaling 100 percent at the end of five years. The current maximum cumulative
23

Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) provided by the National Center for Education Statistics
The only federal loans forgiveness does not cover are PLUS loans which accounted for a small
proportion of federal loan volume.
24
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Perkins loan is $27,500 for undergraduates and a lifetime maximum of $60,000 for
graduate students. By contrast, $5,000 of Stafford debt is forgiven only at the end of the
fifth year teaching. Up to $17,500 of Stafford loans can be forgiven for teachers in lowsupply positions like mathematics and science. In the value-add portion of the analysis
below, I focus on elementary school teachers where I can reliably link students to their
teachers; for this subset, the larger Stafford forgiveness was rarely available.25
The loan-forgiveness eligibility rule is central to my identification strategy. Eligible
schools are those which had at least 30 percent of students designated as low-income.
A teacher was eligible if her school was eligible, and the teacher retains her eligibility
even when the school does not. For instance, consider a teacher hired at a qualifying
low-income school. After her first year, the school falls below the eligibility requirement of
30 percent. Hence the school's new teachers would not be eligible, but a teacher who
taught in an eligible year still qualifies. If a teacher initially chose an ineligible school and
the school then became eligible, she would qualify for loan forgiveness with the first year
of school eligibility being the first to count towards her loan forgiveness. Thus teachers
could have been covered by the program intentionally or unintentionally, allowing me to
differentiate the effects of compensation on retention from the retention associated with
teacher selection into treatment.
This is an attractive environment to study the effects of teacher compensation for
several reasons. First, the loan forgiveness program acts more like a compensation
package than an add-on incentive scheme such as an explicit retention incentive, which
could exert effects independent of compensation. Second, the environment allows me to
test the impact of the most visible form of compensation (upfront compensation) on a

25

The full $17,500 Stafford forgiveness would be available to elementary school teachers
providing special education.
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sensitive margin of teacher supply (new hires). Third, teacher compensation is locally
randomized at the threshold which changes from year to year, providing not only
exogenous variation in teacher compensation within and across schools.
The compensation increase for a given teacher depends on how much qualifying
debt she has. The data does not include information on a teacher's debt load or whether
she receives loan forgiveness. Moreover, it's unclear whether teachers perceive loanforgiveness and salary increases of the same amount to be equally valuable. Because
there is no equivalent quasi-randomization in salary, I am unable to re-scale the loanforgiveness effects into salary effects. Thus I rely on the fact that a dollar less in loan
payments is equivalent to a dollar increase in salary, for low levels of taxation.
In 2009, the average recent U.S. graduate had $15,705 in debt (in 2009 dollars),
a tally that includes 38 percent of students who graduated without debt. The average
student with debt had $24,822 in loans (Avery and Turner, 2012). 81 percent of the $115
billion in loans disbursed that year were public, most of which would be eligible for loan
forgiveness if the graduate became a teacher in a low-income school. Like students in
other states, most students in North Carolina take out Stafford loans, half taking
unsubsidized and half taking subsidized Stafford loans each year. Thus, most graduates
in North Carolina would have received around $5,000 in additional compensation for
teaching in a low-income elementary school. A relatively small proportion of students (3
percent of students per year) receive a Perkins loan with an average yearly amount of
$2,125. I could not obtain individual loan data for teachers in North Carolina, but my
estimate is that among those who had debt, they would have qualified for an average of
$5,319 in loan forgiveness if they taught in a low-income elementary school for five
years. This represents the equivalent of a three to four percent salary increase over the
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first five years of teaching. Being in an eligible school also stops the accumulation of
interest and allows deferred payment.
Theoretical Model
I motivate the empirical work to follow with a simple model. The fundamental
result of the model is that increased compensation can raise teacher effectiveness
through three clear channels, two of which raise the quality of new hires. First, it can
increase the average quality of applicants. Second, it can increase the size of the
applicant pool. Third, it can retain teachers which improves their effectiveness but not
their baseline quality (Wiswall, 2013). Understanding whether compensation does
improve the quality of the applicant pool and whether schools can discern quality from a
larger applicant pool is critical for policy recommendations. If compensation does not
improve the quality of applicants and schools cannot discern applicant quality, increased
compensation is unlikely to yield a better workforce.
In the first stage of the model, the agent chooses a career based on the average
expected utility of two choices, teaching and her best alternative. In the second stage,
she chooses which firms (including schools) to apply to given that career. Choice
functions are monotonic and binary descriptions of the worker's expected utility. Teacher
utility is a function of job-match quality (𝛼), total compensation (𝑠), working conditions
(𝑘), and entry costs (𝑐) of individual 𝑖 in firm 𝑓 in career 𝐽:
J

J

J

J

Uif = u(αi , Sf , k f , c J )
The match-quality parameter, 𝛼𝑖𝐽 , for individual 𝑖 in career 𝐽 is drawn from a
distribution 𝐹 on (−∞, ∞). Agents do not directly observe their match-quality parameters,
but they receive a noisy signal of match quality 𝜃𝑖𝐽 for each career 𝐽 before making their
initial career choices when entering the labor market. The 𝜃𝑖𝐽 signals are assumed to be
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normally distributed with mean 𝛼𝑖𝐽 and variance 𝜎𝛼2𝐽 . Once agents are in the labor market
𝑖

they receive an additional signal, 𝜃𝑖𝐽 , each period they work in career 𝐽; these signals are
independent and identically distributed. Thus, through experience in career J, the agent
acquires a more precise estimate of the match quality, approaching 𝛼𝑖𝐽 .
The agent chooses either to teach or to pursue her alternative career every
period. At time 0, the agent picks the career for which her expected utility is higher, with
utility of the form:

𝑌

𝑈𝑖𝑇

=

𝛼𝑖𝑇

− 𝑐 + 𝑘̅ 𝑇 + ∑ 𝛽 {𝑡−1} 𝑆𝑡̅ 𝑇
𝑇

{𝑡=1}

𝑈𝑖𝐴 = 𝛼𝑖𝐴 − 𝑐 𝐴 + 𝑘̅ 𝐴 + ∑𝑌{𝑡=1} 𝛽{𝑡−1} 𝑆𝑡̅ 𝐴 (𝜓𝑖 )

As before, 𝛼𝑖𝐽 describes the match quality between individual 𝑖 and career 𝐽; 𝑐 𝐽 is
the one-time cost of entering career 𝐽; and 𝑘̅ 𝐽 is the average working conditions in career
𝐽. 𝛽 is the discount factor; 𝑆𝑡̅ 𝐽 is the average salary sequence for career 𝐽 and 𝜓𝑖 is the
ability of the worker. In words, agents make a first-stage career choice based on match,
entry cost, average working conditions, and expected compensation. The alternative
career may pay more to a worker with high 𝜓. By contrast, teacher compensation is
determined by a schedule and is not influenced by employee quality. People choose to
teach if the expected value of teaching exceeds that of the alternative career. Thus an
individual becomes a teacher if and only if:
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𝑌

𝐸[𝛼𝑖𝑇

−

𝛼𝑖𝐴 ] +

̅𝑇

̅𝐴

(𝑐 − 𝑐 ) + (𝑘 − 𝑘 ) + ∑ 𝛽 {𝑡−1} (𝑆𝑡𝑇 − 𝑆𝑡𝐴 (𝜓𝑖 )) > 0
𝐴

𝑇

{𝑡=1}

Accordingly, the probability of being a teacher depends on a monotonic
increasing function of teaching-career match quality and a monotonic decreasing
function of the match quality of the alternative, ceteris paribus. With higher entry costs of
teaching, the individual is more likely to choose the alternative. Finally, as the relative
compensation of teaching declines (including through higher 𝜓𝑖 ), the individual becomes
less likely to enter teaching.
The first channel describing how increased teacher compensation could affect
teacher quality is now visible. Namely, higher salary sequences in teaching will induce
higher 𝜓 individuals to apply for teaching positions.
The expected difference in match quality is uncertain, and agents update every
period as new information shocks arrive. Let
𝑣 = (𝑐 𝐴 − 𝑐 𝑇 ) + (𝑘̅ 𝑇 − 𝑘̅ 𝐴 ) + ∑𝑌{𝑡=1} 𝛽 {𝑡−1} (𝑆𝑡𝑇 − 𝑆𝑡𝐴 (𝜓𝑖 )) which is the net value of
teaching conditional on match quality. Therefore individuals enter teaching if and only if:
𝐸[𝛼𝑖𝑇 − 𝛼𝑖𝐴 ] + 𝑣 > 0
𝐸[𝛼𝑖𝑇 ] − 𝐸[𝛼𝑖𝐴 ] > −𝑣 ,
Because the distribution of shocks 𝜃𝑖𝐽 has mean 𝛼𝑖𝐽 , the expected value is the
average of shocks received:
𝐽

𝐸[𝛼𝑖 ] =

1
𝑛

∑𝑛{0} 𝜃𝑖𝐽 .

𝑇
We call this expectation ̅̅̅
𝜃𝑖𝐽 . In period 0 the agent choses teaching if: 𝜃{𝑖,0}
−
𝐴
𝜃{𝑖,0}
> −𝑣.
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̅̅̅𝑇̅ and ̅̅̅̅
As information shocks arrive, the difference between 𝜃
𝜃𝑖𝐴 may fall below
𝑖
−𝑣 but the teacher will not necessarily leave teaching because she has already paid 𝑐 𝑇
but has not paid 𝑐 𝐴 .
People who initially choose teaching may be divided into three categories,
defined as 𝐴′, 𝐵, and 𝐶 for switchers. These are defined as follows:
̅̅̅𝑇̅ − ̅̅̅̅
𝐴′ = { 𝑖 |𝜃
𝜃𝑖𝐴 > −𝑣}
𝑖
̅̅̅𝑇̅ − ̅̅̅̅
𝐵 = {𝑖 |𝑣 − 𝑐 𝐴 < 𝜃
𝜃𝑖𝐴 < −𝑣}
𝑖
̅̅̅𝑇̅ − ̅̅̅̅
𝐶 = {𝑖 |𝜃
𝜃𝑖𝐴 < −𝑣 − 𝑐 𝐴 }
𝑖
In any given period, the 𝐴′ teachers are those who chose teaching because in
expectation the career delivers higher utility, and their current stock of information
shocks confirms their expectations. The 𝐵 teachers are those who now believe that they
made a mistake in choosing teaching, but the differential does not justify the upfront cost
of moving to their alternative career. Finally, those in set 𝐶 are those for whom the
differential is sufficient to justify incurring the cost of switching careers, including 𝑐 𝐴 and
potentially starting at the beginning of the alternative career's salary progression. In
other words, the expected difference in the match quality must also surmount the cost of
entering the alternative career. Notice also, that as 𝑐 𝐴 → 0, the set 𝐵 shrinks and the
proportion of switchers grows. It seems that in many careers, teachers might consider
alternatives, the cost of entering are quite low (e.g. secretarial work).
Here we can see the second insight of the model---that raising teacher salaries
could increase teacher retention. Since experience increases a teacher's effectiveness
(Wiswall, 2012), though not her latent quality, increasing salary may increase student
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achievement, without even affecting applicant quality or, as we will see, principal quality
predictions.
Next I add another step, the application process, which incorporates the hiring
decision, heterogeneity in the salary sequence, and working conditions of various firms
in a career. Once individuals choose a career, they apply to employers that offer
sufficient utility. Since the entry costs are already paid, they apply to firms that provide
more utility than switching careers. For instance, if an individual chooses teaching, she
applies to schools satisfying:
𝑇
𝑈{𝑖𝑓}
> ̅̅̅̅
𝑈𝑖𝐴 − 𝑐 𝑇 ,

If 𝑧 = 𝛼𝑖𝐴 − 𝛼𝑖𝑇 − 𝑐 𝐴 , she will apply to those schools for which:
{𝑡−1}
𝐴
𝐴 + ∑𝑌
̅̅̅̅
𝑘𝑓𝑇 (𝜌) − 𝑘
(𝑆𝑡𝑇 (𝜌) − ̅̅
𝑆̅̅
{𝑡=1} 𝛽
𝑡 (𝜓𝑖 )) > 𝑧

In words, each agent applies to the firms that deliver higher utility than the utility
of switching careers. Here, the salary and working conditions in teaching depend on the
percent of students that are low income. Low-income areas tend to pay less, but
teachers receive a loan-forgiveness subsidy if a sufficient proportion of the students at
the school are low-income (𝜌 ≥ 30%). Working conditions are also highly correlated with
the student poverty. Teachers leaving teaching commonly cite student discipline and
motivation, both of which are highly correlated with student poverty (𝜌) (Ingersoll, 2001).
School principals select the vector ℎ of hires from the applicant pool according to
𝑇
a selection function based on teacher expressed match quality (𝜃{𝑖,0}
), observed by the

principal as enthusiasm for teaching; the principal also observes a vector ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑖 which
researchers can observe, which is correlated with 𝜓𝑖 . ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑖 includes variables commonly
observed at the time of hire that represent applicant training, work ethic, and natural
ability, including undergraduate selectivity, certification scores, grade point average,
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additional certificates and degrees. Principals also observe ⃗𝑖𝑖 which is a vector of
interview qualities including personality which a researcher cannot observe but may
predict teacher quality. Accordingly:
𝑇
ℎ = ℎ(𝜃{𝑖,0}
; ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑖 , ⃗𝑖𝑖 )

That is, the Boolean vector function ℎ represents the hiring decision for each
applicant as a function of the applicants' research-observable characteristics ( ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑖 ),
𝑇
interview-observable characteristics ⃗𝑖𝑖 , and the match quality (𝜃{𝑖,0}
). While little is known

about the teacher hiring function, it appears that hiring largely ignores academic success
and other observable characteristics that appear to predict effective teaching (Ballou,
1996; Harris et al., 2010 ).
In a competitive market, principals would value student achievement intrinsically
or be compensated for student achievement. In such a case, principals would know
through experience, training or research, the relative importance of the elements of ⃗𝑖𝑖
𝑇
and the value of 𝜃{𝑖,−1}
. The appropriate approach then would maximize student

achievement, a non-trivial problem since those with high academic performance may
have better outside options and thus be more likely to leave. Teacher turnover,
replacement costs, and the expected quality of the replacement are all factors. The
teacher hiring function ℎ( ) would indicate 1 for the applicants that satisfy:

𝑌

̂𝑖 }𝑞𝑡 (𝜓
̂𝑖 (𝑥 ), 𝑡) + (1 − 𝑝{𝑡,𝜓 } )(𝑉𝑟 − 𝑘)
𝑚𝑎𝑥{ 𝑖∈𝐵} 𝑉𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝_{𝑡, 𝜓
𝑖
{𝑡=1}

where 𝑉𝑟 = 𝐸[𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑖∈𝐵′ } 𝑉𝑖 ].
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In other words, the principal will hire applicant 𝑖 from applicant pool 𝐵 to maximize total
student achievement, balanced with hiring costs.


̂𝑖 will remain
𝑝{𝑡,𝜓
̂𝑖 } is the probability that in year 𝑡 a teacher of expected quality 𝜓
at the school, a dynamic separating probability;



̂𝑖 (𝑥 ), 𝑡) is the expected achievement gains of a teacher of expected quality 𝜓
̂𝑖
𝑞𝑡 (𝜓
in her 𝑡th year of teaching at the school;



𝑉𝑟 is the expected value of hiring a replacement;



and 𝑘 is the cost of replacement.
This reveals the third channel described by the model; if principals can

discriminate quality from ⃗⃗⃗
𝑥𝑖 and ⃗𝑖𝑖 then a larger pool of applicants can generate higher
quality hires, even if applicants are no better on average.
Ballou (1996) shows that, given reasonable ranges for retention, quality, and
replacement-cost parameters, current hiring practices in education are far from optimal.
It appears that principals discriminate against more successful graduates, graduates
with degrees in mathematics and science, and degrees from more prestigious
institutions. My results indicate that schools do not discriminate but are indifferent.

𝑇
The properties of the function ℎ = ℎ(𝜃{𝑖,−1}
; 𝑥 , ⃗𝑖𝑖 ) are crucial for determining whether an

increase in the sum of 𝛽 𝑡 𝑆 𝑇 will improve the average quality of teachers if applicant
quality or the number of applicants change. If principals do not infer quality accurately
from 𝑥 and 𝑖 or have hiring priorities orthogonal to teacher quality, raising compensation
will not have a positive impact on teacher quality unless it affects the quality of the
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average applicant. The compensation increase I use is not likely to bring agents into
teaching since it is not part of the compensation package someone out of education
would likely be aware of. Moreover, the quality of teachers interested in debt forgiveness
is likely no greater than teachers who do need debt forgiveness. Thus, my treatment is
able to estimate the impact of compensation through this third channel and reveal
whether principals are able to accurately discern quality through unobservable 𝑖.
Empirical Research Design
In this section I describe my regression discontinuity design (RDD) which
approximates a randomized experiment. Teacher eligibility for federal loan forgiveness
constitutes ``treatment.'' Whether a teacher is treated depends on whether the school
has at least 30 percent of students are designated as low-income. The idea of the
design is to compare teachers at schools that were barely above and barely below the
threshold. Conditional on the low-income share, the covariates---including
unobservables---are balanced across the threshold, yielding an unbiased estimate of the
effect of loan forgiveness on any outcome variable. In effect, some schools randomly
have an additional component of compensation.
Suppose that school j has 𝜌𝑗 percent of students eligible for reduced-price
lunches (relative to the required threshold 𝜌∗ ). Let 𝑏{𝑗𝑡} = 1(𝜌𝑗 ≥ 𝜌∗ ) be an indicator for
school j's loan-forgiveness eligibility. We can write some outcome 𝑦{𝑖𝑗} (e.g. the retention
or quality of newly hired teacher 𝑖 at school j in year 𝑡, for instance) as follows:

𝑦{𝑖𝑗𝑡} = 𝜅 + 𝑏{𝑗𝑡} 𝜃 + 𝑢{𝑖𝑗𝑡}
where 𝜃 is the causal effect of loan-forgiveness compensation and 𝑢{𝑖𝑗} represents all
other determinants of the outcome (with 𝐸[𝑢{𝑖𝑗} ] = 0).
46

In general, school eligibility may be correlated with other school characteristics
that influence teacher quality and retention, so 𝐸[𝑢{𝑖𝑗} 𝑏𝑗 ] ≠ 0. If so, a simple regression
of 𝑦{𝑖𝑗} on 𝑏𝑗 will yield a biased estimate of 𝜃. However, as long as the outcome variable
is smooth function of other factors at the cut-off, eligibility around the threshold
approximates a randomized experiment. In other words, the correlation between school
eligibility for teacher loan forgiveness and unobserved district characteristics can be kept
arbitrarily small, by focusing on schools sufficiently close to the threshold.
One complication to the empirical design is that schools use different measures
of low-income status. I compile the historical data which declared the eligible schools
each year. I merge this data into the NCERDC data and use this to create the treatment
indicator. Because I merged using school name, the matching is imperfect; for schools
that should definitely be treated (e.g. the reduced-price lunch proportion is above 50
percent) about 85 percent of schools have the correct treatment status. I implement a
fuzzy RD design, exploiting the large discontinuity in treatment status that occurs when
the percent of students on reduced-price lunch crosses the 30 percent threshold.
The first-stage regression is thus:
𝑏{𝑗𝑡} = 𝜇 + 𝛿 1(𝜌{𝑗𝑡} > 30%) + 𝑃𝑔 (𝜌{𝑗𝑡} − 30%, 𝛾𝑢 ) + 𝑃𝑔𝑒 (𝜌{𝑗𝑡} − 30%, 𝛾𝑢 ) + 𝜁{𝑗𝑡}
Here we are modeling how the probability of treatment changes with the percent
of reduced-price students. 𝜇 will represent the average probability of being treated 𝜖
below the threshold, because the running variable is now distance to the threshold. 𝛿
represents the discontinuous jump in the probability of treatment when the reduced-price
lunch proportion crosses the eligibility threshold. The results of these regressions with
various bandwidths are found in Appendix B. The results suggest that about 39 percent
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of schools are eligible just before reduced-price-lunch share crosses the threshold
causing the treatment probability to jump by about 27 percentage points.
My RD strategy uses two flexible polynomials of the running variable, so as to
use more of the available information. I present a series of results that start with
estimates that depend on a fifteen-point bandwidth around the threshold and narrow the
focus successively to ten-, five-, and two-points within the threshold. For all bandwidths,
I use flexible controls for low-income share which absorbs variation coming from schools
far away from the threshold, but reduce the polynomial order as the bandwidth narrows.
Assuming that 𝐸[𝑢{𝑖𝑗} |𝜌𝑗 ] (the conditional expectation of the unobserved determinants of
𝑦 given the realized low-income share) is continuous, I can approximate it by a
polynomial of order 𝑔 with coefficients 𝛾𝑢 , 𝑃𝑔 (𝜌𝑗 , 𝛾𝑢 ), and the approximation can be made
arbitrarily accurate as 𝑔 → ∞. I estimate a polynomial of this form on either side of the
treatment threshold. Under this assumption we can rewrite (1) as
′
𝑦{𝑖𝑗𝑡} = 𝜅 + 𝑏̂{𝑗𝑡} 𝜃 + 𝑃𝑔 (𝜌𝑗 , 𝛾𝑢 ) + 𝑃𝑔𝑒 (𝜌𝑗 , 𝛾𝑢 ) + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑢{𝑖𝑗𝑡}

where 𝑢𝑗′ ≡ 𝑢𝑗 − 𝑃𝑔 (𝜌𝑗 , 𝛾𝑢 ) = (𝑢𝑗 − 𝐸[𝑢𝑗 |𝑣𝑗 ] − 𝑃𝑔 (𝜌𝑗 , 𝛾𝑢 )) is asymptotically uncorrelated
with 𝜌𝑗 (and therefore with 𝑏𝑗 ). A regression of hire characteristics on the qualifying
indicator controlling flexibly on low-income share thus consistently estimates 𝜃. I include
time fixed effects in all specifications (𝜔𝑡 ) and run additional specifications using a
control vector 𝑋 which consists of other variables that might influence the attractiveness
of teaching at a given school including student demographic make-up and school type;
the results are identical with and without controls but I lose precision.
I run a series of regressions to infer the effect of teacher characteristics and
treatment on student achievement. These regressions are called value-added models
(VAM) in the education literature. In their most flexible form, which I adopt, one
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regresses the student's test score this year on factors (teacher characteristics or
treatment) and a flexible polynomial of the student's score last year. The coefficients on
the factors is meant to capture the marginal effect of the characteristic or treatment on
student achievement. The practice potentially biases estimates because teachers are
not randomly assigned to students. I follow Rothstein (2010) and use student math and
reading scores as the dependent variable, with the student's last score as an element of
X. Rothstein finds evidence that value-added measures are biased when the lagged test
score is linear. I experiment with a flexible polynomial of the lagged score which
dramatically reduces Rothstein's measure of bias, the predictive power of fifth grade
teacher assignment on fourth grade achievement gains. Intuitively the polynomial
accommodates nonlinear relationships generated by performance mean reversion and
measurement error.
First I estimate an achievement production function, associating achievement
gains with various teacher characteristics while controlling for student characteristics
where possible. The regression takes the form:
𝐴{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔} = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑚𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔 + 𝛽 𝜓{𝑖𝑗𝑔} + 𝛾 𝑋{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔} + 𝑓5 (𝜌𝑗 ) + 𝑔5 (𝐴{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔−1} ) + 𝜈{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔}
𝐴{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔} is student k's test score in teacher i's class at school j in grade g. 𝜆𝑡
represents time fixed effects, 𝑚_{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔} represents a number of fixed effects for missing
data in the student characteristic vector, 𝜓{𝑖𝑗𝑔} represents a vector of teacher
characteristics, 𝑋{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔} represents student characteristics with zeros filled in for those
data that are not available, 𝑓5 (𝜌𝑗 ) is a flexible fifth-order polynomial function of lowincome share, and 𝑔5 (𝐴{𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑔−1} ) is a fifth-order polynomial of the student's last test
score. This estimates the student gains associated with various teacher characteristics
including college selectivity, master's degree, sex, race, and major.
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I then modify the specification to test the effect of treatment. I replace the teacher
characteristics with the treatment indicator, instrumented as in previous regressions. I
add a polynomial on the treatment side and remove the indicators for missing data and
student characteristics.
As discussed, these regressions may not reflect the average quality of treatment
teachers relative to control since students are not randomly assigned. I make student
characteristics the outcome variable in the regression discontinuity. Here the coefficient
on treatment represents how much more likely a treatment teacher is to have students
with a given student characteristic. This assesses the extent of student sorting and
gauges whether treatment teachers are allocated to the intended low-income students.
Following the initial test associating students growth with the treatment status of
their teacher, the subsequent regressions address the concern that students are not
randomly sorted to teachers and thus the value-added scores associated with the
previous regressions may reflect student sorting in addition to treatment. I modify the RD
specifications to pool treatment to the school-grade level. Thus unless treatment
teachers are sorted to whole grades who for some reason have different growth, student
sorting cannot drive the effect. The specification takes the form:
𝐴{𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔} = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑇{𝑗𝑡𝑔} + 𝛿 𝜈{𝑗𝑡𝑔} + 𝑓(𝑟{𝑡𝑗} − .3) + 𝑓′(𝑟{𝑡𝑗} − .3) + 𝑔5 (𝐴{𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)𝑔} ) + 𝜖{𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔}
𝐴{𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑔} is the achievement score of student 𝑖 in teacher 𝑗's class in year 𝑡 in grade
𝑔; 𝑇{𝑗𝑡𝑔} is the share of teachers in 𝑖's grade who are treated; 𝜈{𝑗𝑡𝑔} reflects the share of
teacher in 𝑖's grade who are new teachers; 𝑓 is a flexible function of the running variable,
the share of the school's students who are designated as low-income; 𝑓' is another
flexible polynomial on the treatment side of the threshold. 𝑔5 is a flexible fifth-order
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polynomial of the student i's score last year. The instrument on 𝑇{𝑗𝑡𝑔} is an indicator for
𝑟{𝑡𝑔} > 30%. In all RD regressions, I cluster the standard errors at the school level.
Data
To estimate this model, I combine a number of datasets. Information on teachers
and students (including student test scores) comes from a the North Carolina Education
Research Data Center which created the data from administrative records from 1995 to
2010 in North Carolina. This data source allows me to link students to their teachers to
estimate value-added models. Moreover it includes information on teachers including
their race, sex, absences, and education history; information on students includes their
race, sex, and age and, in some years, information on the student's home habits, parent
education, gifted status, low-income status, and student absences. The data allows me
to calculate the share of students on reduced-price lunch which constitutes my running
variable.
A common measure of teacher quality is the Barron's Selectivity Index; the
National Center for Education Statistics provided this dataset and I merged the university
selectivity score to each applicant's undergraduate institution. Finally, to create the
treatment variable, I compile historical records of what schools were eligible in each
year; unfortunately the school names in the eligibility website are often misspelled, use
abbreviations inconsistently, and have no unique identification. Thus I employ an
iterative fuzzy match which standardizes common abbreviations, transforms capital
letters to lower-case, and removes spaces. This fuzzy match is estimated to achieve 85
percent accuracy.
There are two main data compilations I use in the analysis. The first is a merging
of all data above where each observation is a teacher in a year. These data are used for
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analyses of teacher characteristics and includes all teachers in elementary, middle, and
high schools. The second merges in yearly student test scores for grades three through
six, where I can reliably identify a student's teacher. Thus the value-add analyses only
applies to elementary school teachers. In this dataset, the observation level is a student
in a year.
Importantly, I cannot identify whether a given teacher had eligible loans or
whether she applied for loan forgiveness. Therefore my estimates reflect intent to treat
(ITT) effects, which are the average effects of eligibility, not the average effect of
treatment on recipients (TT).
The data includes approximately 100,000 unique teachers each year which
grows from 88,900 in 1995 to a peak of 112,800 in 2007. Analysis is restricted to
teachers hired in schools within plus and minus fifteen points of the eligibility threshold
and the analysis focuses on narrowing bandwidths of plus and minus ten, five, and two.
The largest teacher sample (that for fifteen points within the threshold) allows a sample
of 38,751 new hires in 2,101 schools over the 14 years the program was in effect. The
smallest bandwidth restricts the sample to 5,381 new hires. In some regressions the
dependent variable was more sparsely reported reducing the usable sample size.
Eligibility only requires that a school has 30 percent of students designated as lowincome, so a large fraction of schools in the sample qualify. 81 percent of schools
qualified in 1997, 88 percent qualified in 2000, and 94 percent qualified in 2005.
When the student data is merged in, I focus on those students in classes with
new teachers so that I can ignore the complicated effects of teacher tenure and turnover
(Wiswall, 2012) and focus on relevant teacher quality. In this sample we observe
325,561 students in classrooms with new teachers over the thirteen years of the
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program. The largest bandwidth, fifteen points, includes 143,941 students and the
smallest, two points, includes 20,573.
Evaluating the Quasi-Experiment
The regression discontinuity strategy relies on using schools slightly above and
below the eligibility threshold, to approximate an intentional experiment. To satisfy the
exclusion restriction, this requires that eligibility be as good as random and that other
determinants of the outcome variable be continuous across the threshold (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). Here I test these assumptions.
Three diagnostics test the validity of the RD quasi-experiment: pre-program
differences in outcome variables and characteristics across schools and hires, the
distribution of the forcing variable, and whether observables are balanced across the
threshold. Each strongly suggests that the exclusion restriction is satisfied.
In order for the RD estimate to be valid, we must assume that, absent the policy,
E[𝜖𝑖 |𝜌𝑠 = 𝑐] is continuous at 𝑐 = 0.30. This assumption would be violated if other factors
affecting teacher supply such as school amenities, working conditions, or other
compensation changed discontinuously when schools reached the 30 percent threshold.
This might be observed if, for instance, treatment ``effects'' existed prior to the program,
suggesting some other determinant was changing discontinuously. The results of such
regressions are uniformly insignificant; this test is enabled by the panel structure of the
data supports the approximate randomness of the design (Cellini, Ferreira, and
Rothstein, 2010). Appendix B contains the regression tables and further discussion from
these placebo tests. These results support the continuity of 𝐸[𝜖𝑖 |𝜌𝑠 = 𝑐] at the threshold.
A discontinuity in the density at the threshold would suggest that schools
endogenously sorted into treatment status, violating the RD requirement (McCrary,
2008). There is no evidence of endogenous sorting.
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Finally I also test whether observable school characteristics are balanced across the
threshold. Rejecting the null hypothesis would imply that schools either sort
endogenously.
In the analysis presented in Appendix B, each coefficient describes the ``impact''
of treatment on the share of students who are respectively Hispanic, Black, or White.
The fact that coefficient estimates are null provides further substantiation that schools
did not endogenously sort over the threshold.
Results
The results require some thought to interpret. First, the coefficients on treatment
sometimes differ with bandwidth and statistical significance is seldom constant. Thus, I
interpret an effect if the coefficients are relatively stable and at least one is statistically
significant at the ten percent level. I also place a higher weight on the narrower
bandwidths which are more likely to approximate a randomized experiment.
First I analyze the effect of treatment on the characteristics of new hires; recall
that these estimates reflect demand parameters since treatment induces an exogenous
supply shock. Schools appear to have no preference regarding the sex or race of the
applicant; the coefficients here are uniformly small and statistically insignificant. Next I
estimate demand parameters for characteristics that have been used as measures of
teacher quality: whether the teacher has a master's degree, a teacher's major, and
undergraduate institution selectivity. What may surprise some readers is that schools
appear to have no significant preference for applicant's with a master's degree or
applicants from more selective undergraduate institutions, but schools do express
preferences for certain majors. Treatment schools at the cutoff are eight percentage
points more likely to hire education majors, nine percentage points less likely to hire a
social science major and 4 percentage points less likely to hire a language major,
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relative to applicants with unspecified majors. Interestingly, schools have no distinct
preference for science, math, or business majors. Because treatment is quasi-random
these magnitudes represent school preferences for these characteristics. This is
consistent with Ballou (1996) who finds that schools appear to prefer teacher applicants
with education majors compared to those with math and science training.
I next look at the behaviors of treated teachers, principally in terms of retention
and effort. Treated teachers are no more likely to stay one or two years (conditional on
staying one) as virtually all stay during the first two years. However, treated teachers are
four percent more likely to be retained three years (conditional on being retained two
years), 17 percent more likely to be retained four year, 42 percent more likely to be
retained five years, and 33 percent more likely to stay six and seven years, even after
loan forgiveness. This reflects the selection effect (the fact that teachers sort into
treatment) and the effect of the incentive itself. In order to separate out the pure effect of
the incentive on retention, I look at teachers who were unintentionally treated, being
those who initially chose untreated schools but then became eligible because their
school crossed the threshold. In these regressions, treatment increases three-year
retention by eleven percent, four-year retention by 19 percent, five-year retention by 21
percent, six-year retention by 20 percent, and seven-year retention by 20 percent. I
cannot directly observe effort, but the number of non-sick absences a teacher has during
a year could represent effort's extensive margin. Treated teachers appear to exert no
more effort, having the same number of non-sick absences as untreated teachers.
I estimate a student-achievement effect of each teacher characteristic. The
university selectivity predicts larger gains in both reading and mathematics, although the
effect is small (a one standard deviation increase in college selectivity is associated with
a .007 standard deviation (𝜎) increase in math and .003 standard deviation in reading). A
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master's degree is associated with a .01𝜎 increase in both reading and math. Males
appear to produce .01 𝜎 more in reading but .01 𝜎 less in math. There appear to be only
statistically insignificant gains associated with teacher race. The most significant gains
are those associated with having an education major, yielding a .06 𝜎 increase in math
and .01 𝜎 increase in reading. Math and science majors ironically appear to predict small
gains in reading and small losses in math. Social Science majors appear to predict small
losses .01-.02 𝜎 in both reading and math. Business majors appear to promote
increases in math (.04 𝜎) and reading (.02 𝜎). To summarize, the best predictor of
teacher effectiveness is having an education major, second is having a business major,
third is having a master's degree. Having a math, science, or language major appears to
predict very little either way. Having a social science major predicts lower achievement
gains. I also include the teacher's certification score, the PRAXIS, and find that it
predicts a precise zero effect in math and reading growth (a one 𝜎 increase in PRAXIS
score is associated with a .002 increase in math achievement and .006 decrease in
reading). Why policy makers would exclude any teacher based on this measure is a
puzzle.
I estimate the same type of model using these same teacher characteristics to
predict retention, as experience is perhaps the most successful explanatory variable in
teacher effectiveness. Here we learn that students from more selective schools are
significantly more likely to leave teaching; a teacher from a 1 𝜎 more selective school is
three percentage points less likely to be retained (on a base of 69 percent). Interestingly,
males are significantly more likely to leave at every stage of their career, being five to
seven percent more likely to leave each year. Whites appear modestly more likely to be
retained in the long-run (two to four percentage points each year) while Hispanics are
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significantly more likely to quit; for instance, they are 13 percentage points less likely to
be retained five years, conditional on staying for four years. Having an education major
predicts seven percentage points higher retention. Math and science majors predict six
percentage points lower retention. Master's degree, social science, language, and
business major predict very little about retention.
What is most interesting about these results is that the preference parameter is
highly correlated with the value-add parameter for a given teacher characteristic, but is
no correlation between the preference parameter and the retention probability of the
characteristic, as seen in Figures 3 and 4. However, teacher retention is a critical factor
in teacher value-add and the preference parameters appear completely unrelated to the
teacher's likelihood of remaining in teaching. Schools appear able to predict inherent
quality fairly well, but do not respond to significant differentials in retention probabilities
which may be more important for student achievement.
Next I see if treatment is associated with larger student gains. Using students
with new teachers near the cutoff, treated teachers induce .1 𝜎 larger growth in
mathematics and .07 𝜎 growth in reading. One concern is that students are not randomly
assigned to teachers and thus these correlations could reflect differences in students
rather than differences in the underlying quality of treated teachers. I find, for instance
that treatment teachers at the cutoff are more likely to be sorted students who are black,
younger, and whose parents' highest degree was a high school diploma. Conversely,
they are less likely to be sorted students who are white or who have parents that
graduated from a four-year college. Interestingly, they are no more or less likely to be
sorted students who are gifted, learning disabled, or poor. This is evidence that students
are non-randomly sorted based on a small number of observables and suggests that the
program is benefiting disadvantaged students if treated teachers are better.
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In order to address non-random sorting of students to teachers, I pool treatment
at the grade-school level following Chetty et al. (2011). That is, I estimate the model as if
a teacher had an effect on the whole grade she is assigned to, not just her class. I
modify Chetty et al.'s approach by making the treatment variable the share of teacher's
in a student's grade who are treated. Using this approach I can estimate the impact of a
treatment teacher on student achievement with much weaker, more realistic
assumptions on student sorting; estimates from these regressions are even larger. A
treated teacher causes .19 𝜎 more achievement in math and .25 𝜎 in reading, which are
imprecisely estimated. These seem implausible large, especially since the reading effect
is larger than the math effect. But these results confirm that the positive effects
estimated in the class-level regressions were not driven by student sorting.
One question is why, given that a master's degree predicts positive growth, why
don't school's prefer applicant's with a master's degree. First, there is mixed evidence
regarding the effect of a master's degree. Hanushek summarizes the literature,
indicating that having a master's degree ``bear[s] no consistent relationship with student
achievement,''and new teachers with masters degrees cost schools an additional $3,200
on average in the first year alone.
Conclusions
Public school teacher compensation makes up the majority of public education
spending and constitutes a key personnel policy (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1997). This
paper uses a regression discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of additional
teacher compensation on the quality of new hires and student outcomes. I identify the
effects of this loan forgiveness program by comparing schools that barely met loanforgiveness eligibility with those that barely missed. Since sorting is not an issue, the
regression discontinuity overcomes several concerns typical of past research.
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I find that the compensation boost caused schools to hire teachers that were
intrinsically more effective, even in the first year of teaching. The program attracts
individuals interested in teaching long-term and exerts a significant effect on retention
even independent of selection. Because treatment acts as an exogenous supply shifter,
we learn about school preferences in hiring. Schools appear to prefer characteristics that
predict intrinsic quality but fail to incorporate into their preferences characteristics that
predict retention. They prefer education majors over hard science, humanities, or social
sciences, and have only insignificant preferences for applicant's with master's degrees
or applicants from more prestigious undergraduate institutions. In response to the
subsidy, schools captured some of the surplus by reducing teacher salary by $204.
The results provide evidence that additional compensation does increase teacher
supply quality. My theoretical model helps suggest that this quality improvement
happens solely through a larger applicant pool, not by better applicants. This suggests,
forcefully, I think, that schools can discern teacher quality even beyond characteristics
observable to the researcher. For instance, by a simple calculation of the quality
improvement brought about by the differential hiring of treatment schools, only a small
fraction of the value-add differences of treatment teachers is attributable to these
observable variables, suggesting that hiring agents discern other strong predictors of
intrinsic quality in the application process. Together the results indicate that higher
starting compensation for teachers would increase new-teacher quality under relatively
weak assumptions.
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CHAPTER 3
Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor-Market Recovery:
Evidence from Florida and Missouri
Introduction
During the Great Recession and its aftermath from 2008 to 2012, US
unemployment insurance programs paid $520 billion in benefits to some 53 million
claimants (Unemployment Insurance Data Summary). These benefits provide significant
insurance and simulative benefits, and many economists argue they impose only modest
distortionary costs (Gruber, 1997; Card, Chetty, and Weber, 2007; Farber, Rothstein,
and Valletta, 2015; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2015).
To finance UI benefits, employers pay a dynamic payroll tax: each year, states
calculate a tax rate for each firm so as to reflect the cost of UI benefits incurred by firm
layoffs. States vary significantly in UI tax policy, reflecting uncertainty about the
consequences of UI taxation. The size of the UI tax penalty represents an important
tradeoff for policymakers: larger tax penalties likely discourage layoffs (a “deterrent”
effect), but the resulting tax increases likely discourage employment (an “overhang”
effect from the previous negative shock) (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Anderson,
1993).
Although an enormous literature has considered the influence of UI benefits on
labor supply (Barro, 2010; Landais, Michaillat, and Saez, 2010, Krueger and Mueller,
2010; Schmieder and von Wachter, 2012; Kroft et al., 2012; Farber, Rothstein, and
Valletta, 2015, Card et al., 2015, Johnston and Mas, 2015), few authors have assessed
the consequences of UI financing on labor demand. I contribute to the UI literature
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measuring these countervailing forces by bringing to bear detailed micro data and quasiexperimental variation. Previous research focused on the effect of experience rating on
temporary layoffs (Feldstein, 1976; Topel, 1983; Anderson, 1993; Card and Levine,
1995).
To estimate the “overhang” effect of higher UI taxes, I exploit a discontinuity in
the UI tax schedule in Missouri that permits me to isolate exogenous variation in the tax
rate. I show that increases in UI tax rates lead to significant increases in firm exit and
declines in hiring and employment, with no effect on the rate of separation or average
wages. Firms respond to their new tax as soon as they are informed the November
before it is implemented in January of the next year. I present additional evidence of the
UI tax effect on employment by leveraging a change in the UI tax formula in Florida.
Again, I find that tax hikes significantly increase firm exit and reduce firm employment.
On average, a 1-percentage-point rise in the UI tax rate increased firm exit by about 1
percentage point and reduced firm-level employment by 1 percent, consistent with an
own-wage elasticity of 3.5. The average labor-demand elasticity estimate is 0.45
(Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch, 2014; Hamermesh, 1996). I explore a number of
explanations for the large effect sizes and demonstrate that these effects are consistent
with a model of cash-constrained firms.
To study the “deterrent” effect of tax penalties on layoffs, I compare how firms
adjust to industry employment shocks when they face different UI tax penalties arising
from the firm’s placement on the tax schedule. Firms at or near the maximum rate face
virtually no penalty for layoffs because their tax rate cannot increase, but firms with tax
rates below the maximum face a tax penalty roughly proportional to their distance from
the maximum tax rate. To account for possible firm differences, I supplement this
approach by deploying a regression kink design which exploits the kink in the tax penalty
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a firm faces as it approaches the maximum tax rate. Using parametric and nonparametric tests, I find no evidence that tax penalties discourage firms from shrinking in
response to negative industry employment shocks. This response is consistent with a
model of cash-constrained firms since the layoff allows the firm to survive the period and
future tax increases are not deterrent.
I test whether these results hold in national data. An important prediction of the
results is that, contrary to the intention of UI taxation, tax penalties for layoffs could
increase labor-market volatility over the business cycle because penalties do not
discourage layoffs but do increase labor costs during recoveries (Anderson, 1993). I test
this hypothesis in a state-level analysis, where I find that experience rating is negatively
related to employment and positively related to employment volatility, conditional on
state and year fixed effects, and time trends. I show graphically that states with more
experience rating recover more haltingly after recessions. Taken together, these results
suggest that UI tax penalties do not discourage firms from reducing employment in
response to negative employment shocks, but resulting tax increases do significantly
decrease employment.
The results are important for a broader literature. First, I show UI taxes, like
benefits, track the business cycle, diminishing the overall stabilizing influence of the UI
program.26 Second, the results speak to the optimal UI literature which seeks to balance
the costs and benefits of UI provision; while the work-horse model assumes workers pay
UI taxes out of their wages in the high state of the world, I show tax hikes do not affect
worker wages but reduce the probability that the worker is employed. Third, UI tax
26

Because the UI tax penalty follows layoffs, UI taxes are highest during labor-market recoveries
and lowest when labor markets are tight. When the Great Recession began in 2007, the average
US firm paid $280 per worker in UI taxes (in 2014 dollars). By 2012, the average firm paid $470,
a 70 percent increase. This is likely an understatement of the tax increase since businesses with
larger tax increases were more likely exit, thus disappearing from the data.
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penalties for layoffs—which disproportionately fall on recovering firms—have increased
by 65 percent over the past 25 years, plausibly slowing labor-market recovery in the
subsequent years, contributing to the recent rise of jobless recovery in the United States
(Berger, 2012).27
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section II describes the US
unemployment insurance program and, in particular, the institutional features I leverage
for empirical identification. Section III describes the data sources used in my analysis.
Section IV presents a conceptual framework of UI taxation. Section V describes the
research design. Section VI presents the effects of UI taxation on labor demand and
section VII discusses the results.
Unemployment Insurance in the U.S.
In the United States, workers who are laid off qualify for unemployment insurance
benefits. The weekly benefit amount is typically a function of the worker’s prior year’s
earnings and the worker’s highest quarterly earnings in that year. State UI programs
paid $80 billion in benefits in 2009 when unemployment peaked. By 2013, annual
benefits paid had fallen to $39 billion, closer to the $30 billion pre-recession expenditure
in 2006. From 2008 to 2012, state and federal UI programs paid out over $520 billion in
UI benefits.
Benefits paid by state UI programs are financed by an employer payroll tax
where the tax rate is calculated for each firm every year. Although the federal
government sets requirements on the structure of state programs, states vary in how
they determine the tax rate for employers. Forty-seven states subscribe to one of two
systems for determining firm tax rates: a benefit-ratio model, or a reserve-ratio model.

27

A jobless recovery is one in which labor productivity rebounds but employment does not. The
three most recent recessions have been followed by so-called jobless recoveries (Figure 2).
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The benefit-ratio model ties a firm’s tax rate to the ratio of the benefits drawn by
the firm’s employees over the past 𝑛 years divided by the firm’s taxable payroll during
those same years. If 𝐵𝑡 represent the cost of benefits drawn by former employees in
year 𝑡, a firm’s benefit ratio is the benefit cost (over the past 𝑛 years) divided by the
taxable wages over those same years:
𝐵𝑅𝑡 =

∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝐵𝑡−𝑗
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑊𝑡−𝑗

where 𝑊𝑡 is the firm’s taxable wage base in year 𝑡. The UI tax rate is a function of the
benefit-ratio, subject to a maximum and minimum. Specifically, between the maximum
and minimum rates 𝜏 𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝜏 𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the firm is assigned a tax rate 𝜏𝑡 = ψ + λ × BR t ,
where the parameters 𝜓 and 𝜆 are chosen by the state.
The principal alternative to a benefit-ratio (BR) model is a reserve-ratio (RR)
model, which is broadly similar. In reserve-ratio states, the state Department of Labor
keeps an account for each firm; the firm’s UI tax payments are credits to the account,
and benefits drawn by former employees are debited the firm’s account. States calculate
a reserve ratio, 𝑅𝑅𝑡 , for each firm expressing the account’s reserves divided by the 𝑛year rolling average of the firm’s taxable wages:
𝑅𝑅𝑡 =

𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑡
1 𝑛−𝑖
∑
𝑛 𝑖=0 𝑊𝑡−𝑖

A firm’s tax rate declines as its reserve ratio increases, subject to a minimum and
maximum rate like the benefit-ratio system. Unlike benefit-ratio formulas which calculate
a tax rate from a simple formula, reserve-ratio states use a schedule or step-function of
the reserve ratio to determine each firm’s tax rate.
Unlike other tax instruments used in the U.S., taxes for unemployment insurance
may exaggerate the business cycle. Because of UI tax penalties, taxes rise in response
64

to economic downturns. Figure 1 plots the real (2014$) average per-employee UI tax bill
over time. The continuous line represents the BLS measure of US unemployment (U3).
In general, the tax bill closely follows the unemployment rate which rises sharply during
recessions, represented by shaded periods. One simple way of measuring whether a tax
is stabilizing or pro-cyclic is to test the correlation between average tax rates and
concurrent unemployment.28 Here, unemployment has a strong positive correlation with
the tax. When the labor market is robust, taxes fall, increasing labor demand. After the
recessions in 1990 and 2001, the average per-worker tax bill increased to approximately
$340. In the recent recession, the per-worker tax bill has increased by 70 percent to
$470 per worker in inflation-adjusted dollars.
Experience Rating over Time
A series of policy changes over the recent decades has increased the tax penalty
associated with layoffs, making UI taxes more cyclical due to larger tax swings when
unemployment is high. Prior authors use the term experience rating to refer to the
fraction of UI costs borne by the claimant’s employer. A firm also pay’s a larger penalty
for layoffs when benefits are more generous or the unemployed claim benefits for longer
periods. This presents two general factors that increase the average tax penalty firms
face for laying off workers. First, the penalty is limited by the extent to which a firm’s tax
bill can rise. Firms with layoffs will pay for less of their benefit charges if the maximum
per employee tax fee is low since it limits the ability of the state to raise revenue from a
firm. Second, the generosity of benefits and how long recipients receive unemployment
insurance affect the tax bill. When a state provides a more generous weekly benefit to
the unemployed, for instance, the firm faces a proportionally larger tax increase for an

28

Under a progressive income tax, for instance, the average income tax rate automatically
declines during a downturn and increases when wages are high.
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otherwise identical layoff. All four of these elements (wage base, maximum rate, average
benefit duration, and weekly benefit amount) have changed since 1985 in ways that
increase the penalties firms acquire for layoffs.
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 increased the
minimum wage base in 1983 and required states to raise their maximum tax rates to 5.4
percent or higher by 1985. Hamermesh (1993) calculates that TEFRA boosted
experience rating by 15 percentage points or 30 percent. The 1991 Emergency
Unemployment Compensation Act increased firms’ tax liability during recessions by
increasing the duration of extended benefits from 13 to 20 weeks, partly financed by
state UI programs. In addition, over the past 30 years, the unemployed have drawn more
benefits through longer unemployment spells and increased benefit generosity.
Figure 3 shows that in the mid-1980s the average maximum rate rose from 4.2
percent to 6.9 percent. This dramatically reduced the share of firms at the maximum
rate, increased experience rating, and raised the potential tax cost of laying off workers.
States cannot fully finance benefits for firms already at the maximum rate, so in practice
states often raise the minimum rate to balance their UI trust funds, exploiting the broad
tax base below the maximum rate. The dramatic reduction in the average minimum rate
supports the interpretation that the increase in maximum rates increased experience
rating by reducing the fraction of firms at the maximum. From 1990 to 2015, the real
weekly benefit amount increased by 19 percent and the average duration of UI receipt
increased by 36 percent (Figures 5 and 6),29 resulting in the average layoff costing 65
percent more since 1990 (Figure 8). Because these costs are charged back to the firm,
29

Reliable estimates of experience rating over time are not readily available as they require a
precise knowledge of the slope of the “rated” portion of the tax schedule and the percent of firms
who are at or near the maximum tax rate in each state in each year. Instead I show that key
indicators suggest a marked increase in experience rating.
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$300 billion in state benefits also represent $300 billion in labor tax increases principally
to firms in distress.
Analysts in the 1970s and 1980s estimated that firms pay about 50 percent of the
benefit costs they originate due to a low maximum tax rate. This meant a significant
fraction of firms effectively could not be charged for marginal benefits (Topel, 1983).
Using administrative records I estimate that firms tend to pay a larger share of benefits
charged than they did three decades ago. I estimate that an average firm in Florida pays
87 percent of benefits originated by the firm, and as high as 98 percent for firms who are
not new and thus can be charged a variable rate. In Missouri, firms pay an estimated 86
percent of benefits originated by the firm.
Cross-State Comparison of Experience Rating
In what follows, I use an industry case study to demonstrate some of the features
of experience rating by comparing how a hard-hit industry was affected in Missouri and
Florida. Florida has relatively low experience rating. Its taxable wage base over this
period was $7,000 and the maximum tax rate was 5.4 percent, thus the highest possible
UI yearly tax fee per worker was $378. By contrast, the taxable wage base in Missouri
was $13,000 and the maximum tax rate 7.8 percent; therefore the highest UI yearly tax
fee is $1,014—nearly three times greater in Florida.
In Figure 9, I plot the average per-employee tax bill of building contractors hard
hit during the recessions in 2001 and 2007. The red line represents the per-employee
tax bill of the average Missouri firm in this industry and the blue line represents that of
the average Florida firm in this industry. Firms in Missouri faced a significantly larger
increase in their tax bill, in part, because the maximum rate and the wage base there
were significantly higher.
Conceptual Framework
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The framework is designed to study the consequence of unemployment
insurance taxes during an initial negative shock and during the recovery. The partialequilibrium framework is described by a three-period model. Period 0 represents the
firm’s behavior in a period of normalcy in which product demand is perceived as stable.
In period 1 the firm receives a negative demand shock, represented by a reduced price
per output, where the timing and depth of the shock is unknown prior to the shock’s
arrival. In the final period, price remains low and the UI tax bill from layoffs arrives. This
classic profit-maximizing model does not rationalize the behavior of firms I observe in the
data, so I point to sensible additions to the model that better describe the firm’s response
each period.
Each firm takes its production function as given and uses labor as its only
variable input; a firm employing 𝑁𝑡 workers in period 𝑡 who receives an average price 𝑝𝑡
earns profits represented by:
Π𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 𝑓(𝑁𝑡 ) − 𝑁𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝜏𝐿𝑡−1

𝑁𝑡
𝑁𝑡−1

A few items require some explanation. First, the wage rate has been normalized to one
so the price of goods is relative to the wage rate. Second, capital is fixed in the short-run
and thus output becomes a function of the variable input, labor. Furthermore, c
represents fixed operating costs including those for the fixed level of capital and 𝜏
represents the cost of a layoff from the last period divided by the employment level from
the previous period, so the firm pays a tax per employee this period. It is assumed that
function 𝑓(𝑁𝑡 ) has a positive first derivative and negative second derivative so that
production increases with employment, but at a declining rate.
Firm employment shrinks by steady attrition at a rate 1 − 𝛿; the firm can increase
its employment by hiring at a rate higher than 𝑁𝑡 (1 − 𝛿), or the firm can decrease
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employment gradually by not hiring. Firms can reduce their employment level more
quickly by engaging in layoffs which increase future taxes:
N𝑡 = 𝑁𝑡−1 𝛿 − 𝐿𝑡 + 𝐻𝑡
The firm begins at some initial employment 𝑁0 in the pre period, which can be regarded
as the optimal employment for current price 𝑝.
In period 1, the firm receives a negative shock, represented by an unexpected
decline in price from period 0. Firms with a sufficiently low new price will engage in
layoffs, shedding workers to increase the marginal productivity of labor. At the same
time, firms are discouraged from laying off workers because they may be required to pay
the future cost of a UI benefit spell for the former employee. Thus a firm’s decision in
period one depends also on the expected profits of period two:
Π1 = 𝑝′𝑓(𝑁1 ) − 𝑁1 − 𝑐
Π2 = 𝑝′𝑓(𝑁2 ) − 𝑁2 − 𝑐 −

𝜏𝐿1
𝑁
𝑁1 2

Firms have no incentive to alter their employment levels in period zero since period zero
is assumed to be a long-run best response to perceived stable prices. Accordingly, firms
do not engage in layoffs and hire at a rate 𝑁0 (1 − 𝛿) in period zero to maintain their
employment level.
The firm maximizes profits by increasing layoffs 𝐿1 if 𝑝′ is sufficiently low.
Likewise, hires 𝐻1 reduces to zero if 𝑝′ is sufficiently low. This will occur even for smaller
negative shocks than those inducing layoffs because of the tax penalties associated with
layoffs. If the tax penalty were simply a bill for benefits discharged the previous year,
then 𝐻2 and 𝐿2 would not be influenced by the tax since the optimal level of employment
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is not affected by the level decrease in profits.30 In practice, the firm can reduce its tax by
further reducing employment and so the tax penalty also reduces hiring in period two.
Thus the basic model predicts firms reduce their layoffs in response to expected
tax penalties and the arrival of tax penalties do not affect hiring in the recovery period.
These predictions alter significantly when cash-constraints are introduces to the
model; this features is likely to be a significant feature of firms suffering negative shocks
and performing layoffs. A cash-constraint is a requirement that a firm ceases to exist if it
suffers negative profits in a period. In a model without cash-constraints, a firm continues
to employ workers so long as positive employment maximizes profits, even if those
profits are negative. If firms are cash-constrained, as they likely would be during and
after negative shocks large enough to induce layoffs, then the consequences of UI
taxation are somewhat unexpected.
If firms are cash-constrained they must make layoffs to survive the recession
period, and the firm cannot be deterred from layoffs by costs incurred in the next period.
Moreover, if firms are cash-constrained, the increased tax bill in the second period
pushes firms against their budget constraint, forcing them to reduce their variable costs,
driving the firm to reduce employment in the period the tax bill arrives. In a model without
cash constraints, there is no firm exit. With cash constraints, some firms will exit during
the recessionary period while others will exit when the tax bill arrives because no
available choices deliver positive profits if the price fall is significantly large.
Finally we could consider the tax penalty associated with layoffs as a random
variable, ∼ 𝐵(1, 𝑝)𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎 2 ) . The firm does not know the benefit cost of layoffs from last

30

A firm can avoid some of the tax penalty by shrinking their employment. To simplify the
exposition, I force the firm to confront the cost in period 2 rather than complicating the issue with
additional periods and notation. This model demonstrates the influence of cash constraints on
firm layoff and hiring decisions.
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period, 𝜏, which can be represented as the product distribution of a Bernoulli and Normal
distribution. There is some probability 𝑝 that a given layoff will not claim benefits. It is
estimated that only about half of eligible unemployed persons claim benefits. These
workers may not claim because they immediately find another job or have other sources
of supplemental income (Anderson and Meyer, 1997b). Conditional on claiming, I
assume for simplicity beneficiary costs are approximately normally distributed with a cap
on the maximum arising from benefit exhaustion. Therefore, a firm may lay off workers
and not know the size of the tax penalty or whether they will receive a tax penalty at all.
Because of this feature, firms may be less dissuaded by tax penalties and may also
respond by reducing employment once the tax bill is revealed in the recovery period.
The tax penalty-as-random-variable and the cash-constraint feature of the model can
explain the large effects of tax increases on a firm’s hiring.
UI tax penalties function as a linear adjustment cost to layoffs (Anderson, 1993).
As the penalty increases, layoffs become more costly and in expectation, the cost of
hiring is greater, reducing the volatility of a firm’s employment. Firms with a zero-cost of
layoffs at the maximum tax rate should be more responsive to employment shocks than
firms with larger potential tax penalties well below the maximum rate.
Once a firm lays off a worker, their UI payroll tax increases. In equilibrium, payroll
tax increases reduce wages with little impact on employment to the extent labor supply
is inelastic (Hamermesh, 1996; Gruber, 1997; Chetty et al., 2011). Unlike other payroll
taxes, UI taxes can vary annually. Because nominal wages are rigid and UI tax changes
may be largely unexpected (Kaur, 2014), UI tax increases do not result in lower wages
but lower firm-level employment. Tax increases represent real-wage increases in the
short run. The exogenous increase in input prices affects firm profits, inducing some
firms to miss their target profit and exit (Hamermesh, 1993). If firms have access to
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credit markets, temporary increases in input price should have a relatively small effect
on firm exit. If firms are cash-constrained and lack access to credit, however, the effects
of unexpected cost increases can lead to more firm exit (Hamermesh, 1996).
Data
I use detailed administrative unemployment insurance and firm UI tax records
from the Florida Department of Economic Opportunity and the Missouri Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations which administer the unemployment insurance programs
in Florida and Missouri, respectively.
In Florida, the data cover the universe of firms participating in UI from 2003 to
2012, with quarterly records for 903,000 unique firms. This information includes each
firm’s industry, employment, wages paid, county, entity type, tax parameters, tax rate,
and the benefit ratio used to calculate the tax rate for each firm. The average firm in the
data has 18 employees and faces a tax rate of 1.7 percent. Firms in the data pay
average yearly earnings of $38,800 per employee in 2014 dollars. The Florida data also
include a UI claim file which contains an observation for each claim, a unique employee
ID, employer ID, employee wages, hire date, separation date, and reason for separating
from 1990 to 2013. The employer ID in this file and the firm file are not the same and so I
am unable to merge the two data sets.
The Missouri data include an observation for each firm in each quarter including
the firm’s account balance, taxable payroll, reserve ratio, tax rate, and six-digit NAICS
industry code. Missouri also provided an employee file which indicates the wages and
the employers of each worker in each quarter. Using these data, I calculate the
employment of each firm and count the number of new hires and separations for each
firm in each quarter.
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Nationally, an employer must enroll in UI taxes, if it has a payroll of $1,500 or
more in a calendar year or has at least one employee working at least a portion of one
day during any 20 weeks of a calendar. The coverage includes businesses, nonprofit
organizations, state or local government employers, and Indian tribal units (Florida,
2012). In practice this means all lawful employers are represented in the dataset.
I also use a number of datasets to study unemployment insurance taxation
across states. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides the Unemployment Insurance
Data Summary (UIDS) which includes an observation for each state in each quarter
describing the state’s benefits paid, number of UI claims, average duration of UI
benefits, exhaustion rate, average weekly benefit, average tax rate, taxable wages,
taxable wage base, fund balance, total loans, and unemployment rate from 1987 through
2013. I supplement this with information from the Commerce Clearinghouse UI Data
which includes records of the maximum tax rates and taxable wage base by state from
1976-2004. I also use local unemployment rates data (U3) from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics for each state. Finally, I use County Business Patterns Data which has countylevel employment figures for each industry, to construct measures of industry
employment shocks using all states but Missouri and Florida, similar to Bartik (1991).
Variables
A number of variables I impute from the wage and employer file require some
discussion. The variable firm size simply sums the number of wage earners reported to
the state Department of Labor each quarter for a particular firm. I infer a new hire if a
worker starts working for a firm he had not previously worked for and remains there for
two or more consecutive quarters. A large number of workers are employed at a given
firm for only one quarter which are not counted as new hires. Similarly, a separation is
inferred when a worker no longer works for an employer who employed him for two or
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more consecutive quarters. One reason for not counting new hires and separations for
those who are employed at a given firm for only one quarter is that these would count as
both a new hire and a separation, dulling the measure’s meaning. Firm exit is inferred as
the last quarter the firm is in the dataset, unless that quarter is also the last quarter of the
dataset.
I calculate a number of variables to describe wages paid by each firm. The most
basic is the average wage which represents the mean earnings paid to a firm’s workers
each year. The average wage is affected by two factors—the skill of labor and the firm’s
wage premium (Abowd and Kramarz, 1999). That is, a firm may pay more for two
primary reasons: the firm employs higher skilled workers (worker type), or the firm pays
more for a given level of skill (firm premium). I estimate each firm’s worker type and firm
premium using a high-dimensional fixed-effect regression. I regress real wages on
worker fixed effects and year-by-firm fixed effects, using a high-dimensional fixed-effect
package in Stata. The year-by-firm fixed effect measures what a given firm pays above
what other firms would pay the same worker which can only be estimated if turnover is
sufficiently high at a given firm to separately identify the firm premium from the worker
type. The yearly firm average of captured worker fixed effects reflects the average
worker type at a given firm. As a second measure of measure worker type, I also capture
each employee’s wage at his former employer.
Empirical Approach
The empirical aim of the paper is to estimate two primary effects of UI taxes. The
second is the deterrent effect of tax penalties in discouraging firm downsizing—the
consequence of UI firing costs. The first is the overhang effect of higher taxes on
employment and firm exit once tax penalties are in place—in essence the impact of a
sudden increase in the payroll tax rate.
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To identify the “overhang” effect of increased UI taxes on labor demand, I
leverage a discontinuity in Missouri’s tax schedule to implement a sharp regression
discontinuity design (RDD). I also exploit a change in Florida’s minimum tax rate
deploying a first-differences design (FD).
Second I investigate the role of tax penalties in deterring firms from laying off
workers. I exploit the fact that penalties vary based on the firm distribution to the
maximum to estimate whether firms more exposed to UI tax penalties react differentially
to industry shocks by using parametric and non-parametric approaches including a
regression kink design (RKD). I test whether firms exposed to larger tax penalties are
less responsive to negative shocks as predicted by past literature (Anderson, 1993).
I complement these strategies with ancillary identification strategies that prove to
be less robust but support the results of the primary identification strategies. I implement
a regression kink design leveraging the kinks in the tax formulae for causal identification
of the overhang effect. Morever, I exploit the tax changes that occur when new firms
become experience rated for the first time, which allows me to precisely estimate the
overhang effect throughout the business cycle. Regardless of the identification strategy,
the results are remarkably similar.
Deterrence Effect: The Effect of Tax Penalties in Discouraging Layoffs
The policy intention of UI tax penalties is to align firm incentives with the social
cost of unemployment benefits, discouraging layoffs and encouraging lower firm
employment volatility. UI tax penalties are a form of experience rating, the insurance
practice of calculating premiums to reflect cost. A number of studies have found
associations between experience rating and lower employment fluctuations, usually
focusing on temporary layoffs (Topel, 1983; Anderson, 1993; Card and Levine, 1994;
Ratner, 2013). I implement a parametric and a non-parametric test of this prediction,
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which is the first time detailed administrative records have been combined with quasiexperimental variation, exploiting the kink in the tax rate that arises from the maximum
allowable rate.
I estimate a triple difference (DDD) model in which a firm’s employment change
is a function of an industry-wide employment shock and an interaction of the shock with
a measure of the firm’s marginal tax penalty for laying off workers. The maximum tax
rate shields firms at the maximum from tax penalties, while firms just below the
maximum face limited penalties, and firms well below the maximum rate face large
penalties for a given layoff:
ln(𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑡 ) − ln(𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 ) = 𝛽𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿(𝛾𝑖𝑡 × 𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡 ) + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜙𝑓 + 𝜀𝑓𝑖𝑡
Here, 𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑡 represents the employment of firm 𝑓 in industry 𝑖 at time 𝑡, calculated from
administrative Florida records. To represent industry shocks, I compute 𝛾𝑖𝑡 from the
County Business Patterns data by calculating the employment in each industry in all
other states and calculating the log-employment change from the previous year (Bartik,
1991). Therefore, 𝛽 represents the percent change in a firm’s employment resulting from
an exogenous industry shock, a unit representing a 1 percent decline in industry
employment. The interaction between this shock and the tax penalty captures how firms
more exposed to penalties respond to industry shocks differentially, captured by 𝛿. I
demonstrate robustness by including firm fixed effects which represent firm-specific
trends in the FD framework. I also demonstrate that the treatment of interest is not
correlated with differential firm trends using a distributed lag model.
I measure the firm’s marginal tax cost (𝑀𝑇𝐶𝑓𝑡 ) following prior work. This measure
indicates the present value of the taxes the firm expects to pay per dollar of benefits
received by former employees (Topel, 1983; Anderson, 1993) who calculate MTC as:
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(𝜌𝛾)2 𝜂

ΔPV tax = 𝑖+(𝜌𝛾)2 𝜂
In this calculation, 𝜌 represents 1 plus the rate of growth in the firm’s employment, and 𝛾
represents 1 plus the rate of growth in average (per employee) taxable wages at the
firm; 𝑖 indicates the interest rate, and 𝜂 represents the slope of the tax schedule. In
Florida, the tax schedule sometimes changes so I experiment with several computations
of 𝜂 including using the contemporaneous slope, the average slope over the past two
years, or the average slope over the decade following Ratner (2013). The results are
robust to any measure used.
One feature of experience rating that has been ignored in previous research due
to data limitations is how experience rating partially depends on the distance a firm is
from the maximum rate. A firm 𝜀 below the maximum rate does not suffer a significant
penalty from marginal layoffs, so the slope of the tax rate locally is not a good measure
of experience rating as the firm approaches the maximum rate. At the other end, a firm
with a minimum rating faces a large potential tax penalty. To capture this variation in
experience rating, I convert Topel’s measure of experience rating into the per-employee
penalty of a 1 percent layoff, a measure developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) to describe the tax penalty. I test to see if my results come from this computation
of the marginal tax cost. The results are consistent with and without the adjustment,
described as follows:
(𝜌𝛾)2 𝜂

𝑐

ΔPV taxes = (1 + 𝑖+(𝜌𝛾)2 𝜂) 300 31

31

C is the cost of the average layoff, divided by three because cost is divided over three years. E
is the employment at the firm. It’s divided by 100 so that the variable measures the tax increase
associated with laying off 1% of the firm, a standard measure used by DOL.
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I also implement a non-parametric test of experience-rating’s effect on
adjustment by separating the firms near and below the maximum rate into bins based on
their reserve ratio. Within each bin, I estimate the relationship between changes in log
firm employment and negative industry shocks. In theory, if the firms are not cash
constrained, the effect of industry shocks should be smaller for firms with benefit ratios
below the maximum than above because they face a tax penalty for additional layoffs. I
plot the coefficient on the industry shocks against the marginal tax cost to visualize the
relationship between the tax incentive and the response to industry shocks.
I document that there are not differential trends using a distribution lag model and
I control for firm trends. But a more convincing avenue to exploit the kink I in the
penalties firms face using a modified regression kink design. The regression kink
approach exploits the fact that the potential tax penalty is kinked due to the maximum
tax rate. As the firm approaches the maximum tax rate, the cost of a layoff decreases
since the firm’s penalty is limited by the maximum rate. Firm characteristics are smooth
across the kink so the expectation would be the firm’s response to industry shocks
evolves smoothly as a firm approaches the maximum rate. If a firm’s response to shocks
is kinked at the maximum tax rate, I infer that the tax penalty affected the firm’s response
to industry shocks. I perform this test parametrically and non-parametrically. The
parametric specification takes the form:
log(𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑡 )−log(𝐸𝑓𝑖𝑡−1 )
𝐾𝑇

= ∑𝑛𝑝=1{𝛽𝑝 (𝛾𝑖𝑡 × (𝑤 − 𝑘)𝑝 ) + 𝛿𝑝 (𝛾𝑖𝑡 × 𝐾 × (𝑤 − 𝑘)𝑝 )} + 𝛽𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
where |𝑤 − 𝑘| < ℎ

The outcome variable is the change in log employment, scaled by the size of the tax
penalty kink, 𝐾 𝑇 . Here, 𝑤 is the assignment variable which is the firm’s distance from the
benefit ratio at which the maximum tax rate becomes binding; 𝐾 = 1(𝑤 > 𝑘) is an
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indicator for being to the right of the kink point, ℎ is the bandwidth, and the slope change
is captured by the parameter 𝛿1 . I provide estimates for various bandwidths and include
quadratic terms for wider bandwidths. A typical regression kink estimation lacks the 𝛾𝑖𝑡
variable and 𝛾𝑖𝑡 interactions. The key is that normally the treatment kink directly affects
the outcome variable. In this analysis, the kink of interest is the firm’s response to
shocks. This approach can be considered a regression-kink difference-in-difference
where a kinked variable may moderate the effect of a shock.
I present this evidence non-parametrically by estimating the relationship between
firm adjustment and industry shocks within bins around the kink and plot the estimated
firm responses to show visually what the regression kink estimates.
Overhang Effect: Results of Tax Penalty Incentive
The results of these analyses appear in Tables 1–3 and Figures 11–12 which
consistently fail to demonstrate that firms are deterred from layoffs and tax penalties.
Recall from the conceptual framework that UI tax penalties represent an
adjustment cost of reducing a firm’s workforce. Because UI taxes impose this cost on
layoff adjustment, theory predicts that firms should retain more workers when they face
negative shocks and hire fewer workers when they face positive shocks. Based on this,
we expect that 𝛽 would be positive, representing the positive effect of a shock in industry
employment on the firm’s employment, precisely, the effect of a 1 percent industry
shock. The coefficient 𝛿 represents the effect of the tax penalty in attenuating the effect
of the industry employment shock, and theory predicts 𝛿 < 0. We expect the effect of the
shock to be significant and positive, and we expect the tax penalty to dampen this
effected represent by a negative coefficient on the tax-penalty-shock interaction. To
complement this, I estimate distributed lag models to explore the common trends
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assumption. I find “treated” firms have common trends before the recovery but not during
the recovery in Florida. Therefore, I limit the analysis to those years where the common
trends assumption holds.
In Table 1 we see that a 1 percent negative industry shock reduces a firm’s
employment by about 0.9 percent which is robust to a number of controls and highly
significant. The coefficient on the tax-penalty-shock interaction is small and not negative,
contrary to the prediction. This point estimate is remarkably consistent, regardless of
how the tax penalty is calculated or what controls are included. Column 1 represents the
calculated tax penalty using the concurrent tax slope while in column 2 I use the average
tax slope over the entire data period. In both calculations, the results are nearly
identical.32 Column 3 includes a control for the firm’s benefit ratio, and in column 4 I add
a measure of the firm’s age. A 1 percent shock in industry wide employment is
associated with a 0.7 percent change at an individual firm, and the tax penalty has a
dampening effect on the impact of industry shocks.
This result might be an artifact of unobservable firm differences along the benefit
ratio, making firms that have lower tax penalties less responsive to firm shocks for some
other reason. To explore this possibility, I perform the same regressions but include firm
fixed effects which capture individual firm trends. Each estimated firm fixed effect
represents the average trend of that firm, accommodating possible non-parallel trends
between firms. While the effect of an industry shock is attenuated, presumably due to
serial correlation in industry shocks and firm adjustment, the coefficient on the taxpenalty-shock interaction is positive and statistically insignificant.

32

In addition, I experiment with a number of moving average calculations of the tax slope and the
results remain remarkably consistent.
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To perform a non-parametric version of this test, I create bins along the benefit
ratio and estimate the relationship between industry shocks and firm employment
adjustment within each bin. I plot these coefficients against the marginal tax penalties in
Figure 11. The expectation is that firms are more responsive to industry shocks near or
above the maximum tax rate where the tax penalties for marginal layoffs are small or
non-existent. Instead, firm response does not systematically vary with the tax penalty.
It is possible that unobserved differences could bias this estimation if those
unobserved differences vary within firm over time. To address this issue, I exploit the
fact that a firm’s potential tax penalty is kinked at the maximum tax rate. That is, the tax
penalty declines linearly as a firm approaches the maximum tax rate until it reaches the
maximum point and the tax penalty stops decreasing. This generates a kink in the tax
penalty that allows for careful quasi-experimental examination. If firm responses to
industry shocks are kinked at that point, it provides strong evidence that the tax penalty
influences the firm’s decision to reduce employment in response to industry shocks.
Hence the change in the slope of the response measures the firm’s sensitivity to the tax
rate.
The regression kink estimates are fairly noisy, but the point estimates are
economically small and statistically insignificant at a range of bandwidths. To show this
non-parametrically, I estimate the relationship between firm employment adjustment and
industry shocks within bins along the running variable around the kink point. I plot these
coefficients around the threshold as shown in Figure 12. The figure confirms the
parametric estimation; namely, there is no discernable kink at the threshold though the
standard errors are too large to rule out a meaningful effect.
Thus I am unable to provide any evidence that UI tax penalties discourage firms
from downsizing in response to negative shocks. As we explored in the conceptual
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framework, one potential explanation of this finding is firms considering layoffs are cashconstrained, implying future tax penalties are not deterring since these employers layoff
workers in order to survive.
The Effect of the Tax
Regression Discontinuity Design
To identify the causal effect of UI payroll taxes, I leverage a relatively large
discontinuity in the firm’s UI tax rate based on its reserve ratio. Recall that Missouri
generates each firm’s reserve ratio based on the firm’s UI account balance and the state
uses a tax schedule to determine each firm’s tax rate every year. The Missouri tax
schedule includes a relatively large, 1.2-percentage-point discontinuity in the tax rate,
which increases the per-employee tax by $152 annually. I use this discontinuity to
compare firms with similar UI histories who experienced different UI tax rates,
overcoming the omitted variables problem which challenged previous work.
I model the outcome variable 𝑌𝑖𝑡 as a continuous function of the running variable,
the firm’s reserve ratio, and estimate the outcome discontinuity that occurs at the
threshold:
(1)

𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑙 (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 ′ ) + 𝑓𝑟 (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 ′ ) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ,

where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is the reserve ratio of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑥 ′ is the value of the running variable at
the tax discontinuity, and 𝑇𝑖𝑡 equals one if firm i is on the left of the discontinuity in year 𝑡
causing a higher tax rate. Here, 𝑓𝑙 (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 ′ ) is a continuous function of the running
variable to the left of the threshold which captures the continuous relationship between
the firm reserve ratio and the outcome of interest. Likewise, I allow for a different
relationship between the outcome and running variable to the right of the threshold by
including polynomial 𝑓𝑟 (𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 ′ ). When the residuals of this approach are serially
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correlated, I take it as a sign of misspecification and add additional polynomial terms.
Regardless the estimates themselves are broadly robust to lower-order polynomials. I
include firm fixed effects which allows me to reduce the residual variation considerably
and isolate within-firm variation in the tax rate (Greene, 1987). An additional virtue of the
firm fixed effects in this context is the resulting estimates reveal the immediate effect of
tax hikes rather than the effect of a stable payroll tax. One concern is whether firm fixed
effects offers the same experimental interpretation as a traditional RDD because the
fixed effects force the regression to use within-firm variation. While it is standard practice
that controlling for exogenous covariates does not affect the causal interpretation of a
traditional experiment, this issue requires more exploration.
To demonstrate that the fixed effects and RDD design work together to produce
the parameter of interest, I use a Monte Carlo simulation. Recall that the long-run effects
of a payroll tax increase are significantly different than those in the short-run; wages are
rigid in the short run and so a payroll tax increase reduces employment rather than
wages. In the longer-run a firm will adjust to a higher payroll tax by reducing wages such
that the tax has little to no effect on employment (Gruber, 1997). The data-generating
process I study creates heterogeneous firms that move randomly around the threshold.
If they fall to the right of the threshold, their employment falls by 1, the true beta I intend
to estimate. If the firm remains treated, the effect on employment attenuates and the
running variable has a positive effect on employment. In Table 4b, the results of this
simulation are demonstrated. A simple regression without fixed-effects or RDD controls
estimates the wrong sign because of the differences of firms along the benefit ratio. Firm
fixed effects get closer to the true parameter because they use within-firm variation, but
they do not control for within firm variation in the benefit ratio that also affects
employment. The RDD alone also systematically underestimates the effect of the
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threshold because it estimates the average effect at the threshold, not the immediate
effect of interest. When these two control designs are combined—the regression
discontinuity with firm fixed effects—the effect is estimated accurately. The runningvariable controls account for within firm differences in time and force the regression to
estimate the effect at the threshold while the firm fixed effects allow the estimation of the
true short-run effect by exploiting within firm variation.
Another important advantage of including firm fixed effects is that it can account
for considerable noise arising from firm heterogeneity. To demonstrate this, I run the
same Monte Carlo simulation but now I introduce larger firm heterogeneity in the firm’s
initial size. With considerable firm heterogeneity, the RDD without firm fixed effects
estimates the effect imprecisely and maintains the bias described in the first exercise
(Table 4c). When firm fixed effects are included, the true beta is precisely estimated. In
short, the Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the purpose of the firm fixed effects:
they provide precise estimates and identify the short-term effect of tax increases.
I focus on firms in Missouri whose average per-worker wages were less than
$50,000 over the data period in real terms ($2014). This is intended to focus on firms for
which the tax represents a meaningful fraction of employment costs. I also consider a
range of alternative bandwidths to assess robustness. The standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and I have collapsed the data at the firm-year level to use yearly data
rather than quarterly in most analyses.
Regression Discontinuity Design Results
Two primary threats would undermine the validity of the RD design. The first is if
firms can precisely manipulate their position on the UI tax schedule, creating selection
bias. The second is if other determinants are also discontinuous at the tax threshold. I
begin by testing for manipulation of the running variable, which would occur if firms could
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strategically manipulate their reserve ratio around the tax threshold. If strategic
manipulation had occurred, we would see an excess density of firms on the favorable
side of the threshold and a deficit density on the less favorable side; this intuition is
formalized by a McCrary test (2008). Figure 14 is a histogram representing the
distribution of the running variable (the reserve ratio) around the threshold. The eye
suggests and the McCrary test confirms that there is no statistically discernable
manipulation around the threshold (Figure 15).
A second threat to identification is if some other determinant of the outcome is
discontinuous at the threshold. There are numerous predetermined variables with which
I construct an index of predicted outcomes using all fixed covariates in the data, similar
to Card et al. (2015). To construct the index, I regress firm size, hiring, and firm exit
respectively on two-digit industry indicators, a measure of firm age, and year. Figure 16
plots the mean values of the covariate indices over the running variable. Using my RDD
specification, the predicted-value discontinuity at the cutoff is small and statistically
insignificant. The lack of evidence of sorting and differences in predetermined
characteristics around the threshold supports the assertion observable factors are
balanced around the threshold.
I conducted informal interviews with employees of the state department of labor
to determine if any other policies turn on at the cutoff of interest. Each of five employees
indicated there were no other policies that were affected in any way by the reserve ratio
and other state departments had no access to the reserve ratio measure preventing
them from applying policy dependent on the reserve ratio.
I implement a number of placebo regressions to probe the validity of the design.
First I estimate the model using outcome variables that preceded treatment and find no
significant effects (Figure 17). I also estimate the model for firms who were excluded
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from the sample for paying more in average wages. As expected, the estimated effects
are smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Finally, I test whether the firm fixed effects may produce bias. Because
controlling for firm fixed effects requires within-firm changes in tax rate, it may be that the
RDD compares dissimilar firms at the threshold. In order to probe this concern, I
implement a robustness test similar to Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2014), limiting the
analysis to firms who originated on one side of the tax discontinuity. Using this method,
the RDD estimator compares only firms who originated on one side and continuously
migrated toward the threshold with some firms quasi-randomly crossing the cutoff.
These intuitive estimates match the baseline regressions in magnitudes and significance
(Table 4). This supports the assertion that the RDD successfully compares like firms at
the cutoff.
The regression discontinuity estimates the effect of a $152 per-employee tax
increase on firm outcomes. The tax appears to have an economically significant effect
on firm size, shrinking the average firm by 0.5 employees where the average firm in the
data consists of 21.5 employees, or about 2 percent, although these estimates are
insignificant at conventional levels (Table 5). The tax increase does not appear to affect
the rate of worker separation, but does reduce the rate of quarterly hiring by 0.3 hires
per quarter, highly significant at conventional levels (Table 5). The average firm hires 1.8
employees each quarter. The RDD estimates also suggest that the higher tax rate
increases firm exit by 1 percentage point, up from an average rate of 10 percent annual
exit (Table 5), about equivalent to the effect of a 4-6 point negative industry shock.
These estimates are larger than predicted by average labor demand elasticities.
To complement this analysis, I consider a natural experiment in Florida where UI
taxes increased for one group of firms, but left another group unaffected. I vary the
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bandwidth and show that the results are robust to a variety of bandwidths in Figures 17e
and 17f. In figure 17d I demonstrate the effect of the tax increase in event time. In the
quarter before the tax increase is announced to the firm, the firm does not alter its hiring
decision. Firms receive their tax letter in November. In the quarter in which the firm
knows its new tax but does not yet face this new tax, it reduces hiring. When the tax is
implemented, the firm’s hiring falls significantly. A significant literature finds minimal
effects of payroll taxes. Since firms begin to respond when informed this harmonizes in
part how I can document significant consequences of payroll taxes while well anticipated
payroll tax changes show little effect when the tax is implemented.
First-Differences Design
In the aftermath of the 2008 recession, Florida’s UI trust fund was depleted. The
state fund represented about 98 percent of wages 2007 falling to 6 percent by 2009. In
2007, Florida’s reserves were average among the states but fell to 49th by 2012. This
dramatic decline took place, in part, because Florida has a small wage base and a low
maximum tax rate, so a large fraction of firms was not charged for marginal layoffs. 33 To
shore up the UI trust fund, Florida raised the minimum tax rate substantially from 0.1% in
2009 to 1.5% by 2012, to leverage the large tax base of firms below the maximum rate
with no change in the maximum rate. I deploy a first-differences (FD) design comparing
firms consistently at the minimum rate to those who were consistently at the maximum
rate. Figure 18 shows the tax changes in the minimum tax rate over time in Florida.
I identify firms who are consistently at the maximum or minimum rate and use
them to estimate the model:
Δ𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽Δ𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖
33

Florida also covered its UI operating expenses by borrowing from the federal government $2.2
billion or $330 for each employee.
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Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents the outcome variable (e.g. firm employment and firm exit); 𝜏𝑖𝑡
represents the tax per employee in $100 (2014$); 𝛿𝑡 represent year fixed effects which
captures the average change in 𝑌𝑖 each year and 𝛼𝑖 represents firm fixed effects which
capture each firm’s linear trend. These firm trends, if unaccounted for, could bias
estimates if trends correlate with the tax changes. The standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
One potential concern is that firms at the minimum and maximum may be very
different and thus subject to different shocks which may be confounded with tax
changes. As a response to this concern, I use the simulated tax increase from the
formula change as an instrument on the firm’s tax change near the maximum to
compare similar firms, some of whom receive an exogenous tax shock because of policy
changes.
First-Difference Results
Florida dramatically raised its minimum UI tax rate after the recession to shore up
the state’s UI trust fund. This policy change affected firms at the minimum rate, but not
those at the maximum rate. Implementing a first-differences design comparing firms at
the minimum who underwent significant tax increases to those at the maximum, I find
that a $100 increase in per-employee taxes reduce employment by 0.24. The tax
increase of $100 is associated with a 0.9 percentage point (9 percent) increase in the
firm exit rate, on a base of 4.9 percent. The identification assumption is that firms
undergoing a tax change would have trended parallel to the firms that did not experience
a tax increase. To evaluate this assumption, I include firm-specific time trends, and all
results remain robust to this inclusion, consistent with the identification assumption. The
employment effect increases slightly to a 0.28 employee reduction. The firm exit
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increase is 0.6 percent with firm trends.34 Another robustness test implements a placebo
where I regress current outcomes on future tax rates. The coefficients in this regression
are small and insignificant, demonstrating the effects are not driven by selection since
firm size is not significantly correlated with future taxes. There can be no effect on firm
exit rates because the exit in years before a firm exits must be zero.
Regression Kink Design
The maximum tax rate in Florida creates a kink in the tax rate as a function of the
benefit ratio. The regression kink design (RKD) relates a kink in the outcome variable
with a kink in a policy variable, the tax rate. Unbiased identification relies on two
assumptions. First, the assignment variable must have a smooth marginal effect on the
outcome of interest. Second, the density of the unobserved determinants of the outcome
variable must evolve smoothly with the assignment variable at the kink point. If these
conditions are not met, the kink in the outcome variable is confounded with other factors
and the causal estimation is statistically biased. Although firms can know the placement
of the tax kink, it is virtually impossible for firms to precisely manipulate their tax rate
because it depends on the value of benefits drawn by laid-off workers. An employer
would find it impossible to precisely control the duration of each former worker’s benefit
receipt, precluding precise manipulation around the kink. Moreover, I have been unable
to document any evidence that firms act strategically to game the unemployment
insurance formula.
The RKD estimate measures the slope change in the outcome variable at the
treatment kink and scales the slope change by the slope change in the treatment

34

Because exit is an absorbing condition, firm fixed effects will always attenuate the estimate
towards zero. Since the trend will be positive for exiting firms and zero for ____ surviving firms.
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variable. The numerator can be estimated by implementing a parametric polynomial
model:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝑛𝑝=1 𝛽𝑝 (𝑤 − 𝑘)𝑝 + 𝛿𝑝 (𝑤 − 𝑘)𝑝 × 𝐾 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , where |𝑤 − 𝑘| < ℎ
Here, 𝑤 is the assignment variable, 𝐾 = 1(𝑤 > 𝑘) is an indicator for being above the
kink point, ℎ is the bandwidth, and the slope change is captured by the parameter 𝛿1 .
Estimates should be interpreted as the average treatment effect for firms near
the kink. For estimation, I divide the outcome variable by the policy kink change in $100s
of dollars in 2014 dollars so that the estimates reflect the average effect of a $100
increase in per-employee taxes. I implement a separate regression for each year with
varying bandwidth and 𝑝 = 1 and 𝑝 = 2. All regressions are estimated with standard
errors clustered at the individual firm level.
The estimates are only precise for employment, but yield similar point estimates.
Like the RDD and the FD, the RKD estimand implies that a $100 increase in the tax rate
decreases employment by 0.20 employees or about 1 percent (Figures 9 and 10).
Experience Rate Introduction (ERI) Estimation
In Florida, new firms become experience-rated the January after a new firm’s first
10 quarters, creating variation in tax rates for approximately 70,000 firms each year. This
variation can be used for identification similar to Anderson and Meyer (2000) who use
the introduction of experience rating in Washington State for estimation. In this strategy,
I exploit the tax change that occurs when firms become experience rated to estimate the
influence of the tax. This estimation is imperfect, in part because firms can respond to
the tax rate in expectation so the strategy may provide estimates biased toward zero.
The underlying identification assumption is that the tax change induced by experience
rating’s introduction is not correlated with the firm’s trend in employment. The principal
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value of this strategy is that it allows for the estimation of the effect of the tax over the
business cycle.
I estimate the employment effect over the business cycle using the ERI
estimator, associating changes in employment with tax changes arising from the
introduction of experience rating each year for new firms. Like the RDD, FD, and RKD
estimates, this estimator implies that a $100 increase in per-employee UI fees reduces
employment by 0.30 employees. When estimated by year, I find that the effect of the tax
is significantly larger in 2008 and 2009, reaching 0.5 in 2009. Afterward, the effect
declines back to the pre-recession effect level but then declines again (Figure 17). This
suggests that firms may be especially sensitive to the tax during the worst of a
recession.
Discussion
In this paper I measure two counter railing influences of UI taxation: the intended
consequence of deterrence and the unintended consequence of tax overhang. The
intended effect of the UI tax in discouraging layoffs is not apparent in the data. The UI
tax increase resulting from the layoffs appears to reduce hiring and increase firm exit
significantly.
The results imply that a 1 point increase in tax rates decrease a firm’s
employment by about 1 percent. Taking the average wage as the base, the implied
elasticity is 3.5. Comparing this to the results of meta-analysis regressing own-price
labor demand elasticity on study characteristics (whether it used administrative data, the
time period, whether wages were instrumented, whether panel FE were employed, etc.),
I find the average labor demand elasticity in contexts similar to mine is 0.9 (Lichter,
Peichl and Siegloch, 2014). This is the average short-run elasticity estimate from
reduced-form papers focusing on low-skill labor demand, using instrumented wages,
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administrative data, and firm fixed effects using data from the 2000s. For instance,
measure elasticity for more recent periods have been higher, presumably because of
falling costs associated with mechanization and international coporations.
To explain why this paper finds very little role for UI tax penalties in discouraging
layoffs, while the previous literature finds a rather large effect (Topel, 1983; Anderson,
1993; Card and Levine, 1994), I offer several thoughts. First, the small estimated
response is consistent with a plausible model of cash constrained firms. I use new
administrative data and within state quasi-experimental methods while previous studies
have used cross-state variation in tax penalties for identification. One concern with
cross-state variation is the possibility intentional location selection could drive firms with
more unemployment risk to states with limited tax penalties, plausibly generating the
correlations previous analysts have observed. It is also possible that my results and
previous work are consistent. Perhaps firms are responsive to state-specific variation
because they are more able to understand the tax penalties of their state, than the
penalties they face from their location on a schedule.
The estimates presented here regarding the effect of UI payroll tax increase are
large compared to estimates from other papers studying payroll taxes (Gruber, 1997;
Kugler and Kugler, 2002; Egebark and Kaunitz, 2014). Among papers that identify a
negative effect of payroll taxes on employment, prior estimates tend to imply a demand
elasticity smaller than one. Two papers that specifically identify the effect of UI taxes
specifically estimate larger effects: Anderson and Meyer (1997) find that a 1-point
increase in UI taxes are associated with a 1.4 percent reduction in firm employment
implying an elasticity of greater than one. Anderson and Meyer (2000) report enormous
effects, though over a time frame when the tax would reduce wages rather than
employment (1-point tax increase reduced wages by up to 4 percent). It is possible that
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the unique features of UI taxation cause larger unemployment effects. Normally, Payroll
taxes increases are announced well in advance, allowing companies to gradually adjust
employment and wages in expectation of the tax change. The authors of this literature
tend to tax the tax change as the event of interest rather than the announcement plus
the implementation of the tax change, possibly leading to underestimation of the payroll
tax effect. In contrast, UI taxes are announced a month before they are implemented,
allowing little time for firms to adjust employment and wages, allowing for a careful
evaluation of the short-run payroll tax change.
In Missouri, a firm’s new reserve ratio is calculated in July, at the beginning of the
third quarter, but firms are not notified of their next year’s tax rate until November and
the tax does not rise until January. Firms are completely unresponsive to next year’s tax
rate in Q3 when their new reserve ratio is calculated but they are unaware of their new
tax. In Q4 firms learn their new tax rate and tax-hiked firms at the discontinuity reduce
their hiring by 0.18 hires that quarter, significant at conventional levels. The following
quarter when the tax rate increases, tax-hiked firms reduce hiring by 0.60 hires that
quarter. Hiring is lower for the rest of the year, but the effect moderates significantly.
Furthermore, UI taxes represent, in effect, a head tax because the taxable wage
base is smaller than most employees’ yearly wages. Unlike other taxes, that means the
tax discourages the quantity employed more so than the quantity of wages paid. Finally,
UI taxes are not predictable. About half of layoffs do not claim benefits and workers can
vary widely in how long they remain unemployed, receiving benefits; the large variation
in benefits drawn makes predicting the tax difficult for firms. Because of this, firms may
interpret unexpected tax increases as indicative of the future, and thus overreact to this
period’s tax change.
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Another important feature discussed in detail in the conceptual framework
section of UI tax is that they may broadly apply to firms who have experienced a
negative shock and may be cash-constrained. As discussed, this explains why firms
respond strongly to the tax bill but are not significantly deterred by tax penalties.
In order to survive the period, a cash constrained firm must reduce its variable
costs so that no matter what the penalty, the firm is unlikely to be discouraged by future
tax increases.35 Because the firm’s cash constraint may be serially correlated, it is likely
to be cash constrained the taxes rise, causing the firms to further reduce variable costs
by decreasing hiring and surviving with fewer workers. This explanation is helpful
because it illuminates the unexpected pattern of firm responses, based simply on the
firm’s need to meet its financial obligations to survive. Similarly, cash constraints explain
why tax increases can induce some firms to exit.
The timing of these effects as well as the effect of the tax on firm exit is
consistent with the explanation that firms adjust as information becomes available. The
estimated effect of the tax increase on exit is unexpected. I cannot locate any literature
that has exploited quasi-experimental variation in regulation or taxes and reported an
effect on firm exit, which could be for a myriad of reasons.36 To assess the size and
cause of the exit effect, I estimate the effect of industry shocks on firm exit. The effect of
a 1 percent UI tax increase is about equal to a 4-6 percent negative industry shock. To
compare my effects to the effects of other taxes I use changes in state corporate and
individual income taxes to assess their effect on bank exit using credit union and nonaffected corporations as a control group. This exercise shows that firm behavior is highly

35

Using data from Compustat, I verify that industries undergoing negative shocks appear to be
also be from somewhat more cash-constrained industries.
36
Analysts may not find effects on firm exit, may not be interested in firm exit, or systematically
report null effects on firm exit to preserve the interpretation of other results.
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responsive to income taxation, and firms are about 0.2 percent more likely to exit when
tax rates rise by one point.. Because income taxes only reduce surpluses and do not
introduce new costs, this makes sense in light of the leading explanation of the data,
namely, UI taxes increase input costs which put a firm’s viability at stake.
Conclusion
UI tax penalties are intended to discourage layoffs and recoup the cost of
unemployment benefits. In this paper, I measure two consequences of this tax program:
the effect of UI penalties in discouraging layoffs (the “deterrent” effect); and the effect of
UI tax increases on employment and exit (the “overhang” effect). Through a variety of
quasi-experimental designs, I report that a 1 point increase in UI tax rates results in an
employment reduction of about 1 percent and an increase in the firm exit rate of about 1
percentage point, though I find no evidence that tax penalties deter layoffs. A model of
profit-maximizing firms with cash constraints explains why firms react strongly to tax
increases but are not deterred by future tax increases.
Economists tend to think of the UI program as an automatic stabilizer because
benefits discharge at times when unemployment is high. I show that UI taxes also track
the business cycle, diminishing the overall stabilizing influence of the program.
Moreover, the results measure the cost of UI financing and thus have implications for the
optimal UI literature. The work-horse model of optimal UI assumes workers pay the tax
from their wages in the high state of the world, but my results demonstrate that, at least
in the short-run, tax increases do not reduce a worker’s wages, but instead affect the
probability the worker is in the low state of the world. This understanding of the
unintended costs of UI benefits may alter our perception of the optimal generosity and
duration of UI benefits.
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Finally, tax penalties increased dramatically in the mid-1980s as the federal
government induced states to increase their maximum tax rate and their taxable wage
base. Since then, the cost of unemployment to firms increased as workers became
eligible for more generous benefits and chose to receive unemployment insurance for
longer periods of time. My evidence is consistent with the claim that these increases
contribute to the rise of jobless recovery since the in1980s and I demonstrate that
employment recovers more haltingly in states with higher tax penalties.
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